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2If they could read their stuff, they’d stop writing. 
– Will Rogers, on Hollywood 
I. From Hollywood to Cannes 
Perhaps nowhere are the forces, tensions, and contrasts of cultural 
globalization more evident than the Cannes Film Festival.  Held annually since 
1946 (with only two interruptions) in the French Riviera resort town of Cannes, 
the festival has grown from a modest showcasing of cinematic art to a “highly 
mediatized” event attracting thousands of journalists and corporate interests.  
Though founded through the efforts of the Association Française d’Action 
Artistique (French Association for Artistic Action), and sponsored by France’s 
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Ministère de 
l’Education Nationale (Ministry of National Education) and Centre Nationale de 
la Cinématographie (National Cinema Center), the Cannes Film Festival today 
styles itself as “an annual tribune for international film, where all styles, schools 
and genres have their place.”1
Of course this includes not only auteur cinema,2 but high-budget, star-
studded, special-effects-laden Hollywood productions.  And there’s the rub.  As 
New York Times film critics Manohla Dargis and A.O. Scott have observed, each 
year brings “the same complaints:  from purists who accuse the Cannes Film 
Festival of selling out its tradition of artistic prestige for the glamour and lucre of 
Hollywood, and from the more commercially minded scenesters who wonder 
why Cannes lavishes so much attention on esoteric, difficult films bound for an 
ever-shrinking audience of cognoscenti.”3 Cannes’ organizers, perhaps making 
lemonade of the lemons in hand, write that “the Festival has become famed for 
the balance it has established between artistic quality of films and commercial 
impact.”4 But not all share that view.  Lynn Hirschberg, also of The New York 
 
1 Festival de Cannes, Background, available at http://www.festival-
cannes.fr/organisation/histoire.php?langue=6002 (accessed Sept. 8, 2006). 
2 “Auteur” is used in film theory to describe a director “whose personal influence and artistic 
control over his or her films are so great that he or she may be regarded as their author.”  
“Auteur theory” likewise is “a critical theory … based on a belief that a film-maker may be 
considered as the creator of a body of art, with individual styles, themes, and techniques 
identifiable throughout their work.”  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, “auteur,” Mar. 2002. 
3 Manohla Dargis & A.O. Scott, At the Cannes Film Festival, Brows Range From High to Middling, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 17, 2006, available at 
http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2006/05/17/arts/web.0517cannes.php 
(accessed Sept. 7, 2006). 
4 Festival de Cannes, Background, supra note 1. 
3Times, wrote of the 2004 festival that it “epitomized the extraordinary global 
reach of American films – sometimes to the point of absurdity.”5
While other countries’ entries appeared reflective and probing, taking 
“globalism as a chance to reveal their national psyches and circumstances 
through film,” America offered up “Shrek 2” – a computer-animated sequel from 
DreamWorks depicting the on-going adventures of a green ogre, his princess 
bride, and a donkey.6 In this contrast, Hirshberg detected an unsettling feature 
of the image of America projected to the world by Hollywood.  Perhaps 
ironically, in an effort to maximize the global audience, big Hollywood film 
companies had moved away from stories exploring American life and culture, 
gravitating rather – by the pull of “corporate finances” – toward lowest-
common-denominator themes scrubbed of cultural specificity in order to give the 
film the best chance of resonating across cultures and selling across borders:  not 
nuanced dialogue, but action and special effects, and certainly not America, but 
“an invented, imagined world, or one filled with easily recognizable plot 
devices.”  Evidently it works.  As of November 2004, “Shrek 2” was the third-
highest grossing film ever.7 But of course this is not the only way to maximize 
revenues.  Oliver Goodenough has identified another means of expanding the 
global audience in Hollywood’s “devotion to pushing the hot-buttons of human 
gratification, … pour[ing] out high-violence, high-sex, high-materialist product” 
– what he aptly terms “the salt, fat and sugar of the human psyche” – which, like 
McDonald’s fries, readily appeal to the human animal the world over.8
5 Lynn Hirschberg, What Is an American Movie Now?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 14, 2004, at 88, 90.   
6 Id. at 90.  Of course 2004 was also the year that Michael Moore’s “Fahrenheit 9/11” won Cannes’ 
highest award.  Id., although it was widely speculated that the award had more to do with 
politics than art.  See, e.g., David Gritten, Cannes jury told to vote for the film, not politics, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/05/12/wcann12.xml (accessed Jan. 
25, 2007). 
7 Hirschberg, supra note 5, at 90-91.  DreamWorks’ reliance on Shrek may, however, have proven 
excessive.  In 2005 the company had to restate earnings estimates due to miscalculation of “Shrek 
2” DVD sales (leading to an informal inquiry by the Securities and Exchange Commission), and 
by early 2007 the studio risked “looking like a one-trick pony whose only trick is the popular 
‘Shrek’ franchise.”  Plans to remedy this included doubling the production schedule from one 
year to two in order to produce better products – though the company did anticipate at least two 
more Shrek films, which would bring the total to five.  According to a DreamWorks executive, 
while sequels are more expensive (due to the “higher costs involved in luring back the talent”), 
they involve less risk and tend to do better overall.  Merissa Marr, DreamWorks Reboots for Life 
Beyond ‘Shrek,’ WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2007, at B1.   
8 Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to the Death?  Free Trade, National Identity, and 
Canada’s Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 203, 226 (1998), available at Lexis. 
4The French and many others around the world – notably the Canadians – find 
themselves of two minds when it comes to Hollywood production.  As 
consumers, they appear all too ready to buy what Hollywood sells, and 
Hollywood’s domination of international film markets reflects it.  Whereas           
one percent of films shown in the United States are foreign, Hollywood 
production represents 85 percent of ticket sales globally,9 reportedly grossing 
$9.2 billion in 2004 alone – an 80 percent increase over the prior decade.10 The 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), Hollywood’s trade and 
lobbying group, along with its “international counterpart,” the Motion Picture 
Association (MPA), have trumpeted Hollywood’s global dominance, observing 
that “U.S. films are shown in more than 150 countries worldwide,” and that the 
“U.S. film industry provides the majority of home entertainment products seen 
in millions of homes throughout the world.”11 
In this light, it is surprising neither that film companies in other countries 
have found it difficult to make it, continually losing domestic market share to 
their larger and better endowed American competitors, nor that their 
governments have stepped in, endeavoring to support their efforts through 
various regulatory measures.  The impact of American popular culture has been 
especially great in Canada, where 75 percent of the population is estimated to 
live within 100 miles of the U.S. border,12 and which accounted for only 2.7 
percent of its own cinema ticket sales in 2003.13 The Canadian government, in 
response to the omnipresence of American media, has maintained a raft of legal 
mechanisms aimed at protecting and promoting domestic producers of cultural 
goods and services, ranging from subsidies, to tax incentives, to quotas requiring 
that specified quanta of “Canadian content” be shown in Canadian cinemas and 
broadcast by Canadian television and radio stations.14 Many other countries, 
including France, have maintained similar domestic policies for similar reasons.15 
9 Eireann Brooks, Note, Cultural Imperialism vs. Cultural Protectionism:  Hollywood’s Response to 
UNESCO Efforts to Promote Cultural Diversity, 5 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 112, 134 (2006), available at Lexis. 
10 Alison James, Gaul won’t stall H’wood anytime soon, VARIETY, Nov. 6, 2005, at 8, available at Lexis. 
11 Motion Picture Association of America [hereinafter MPAA], About Us, available at 
http://www.mpaa.org/AboutUs.asp (accessed Sept. 6, 2006). 
12 See National Geographic Society, Canada, available at 
http://plasma.nationalgeographic.com/places/countries/country_canada.html (accessed Sept. 8, 
2006). 
13 See James, supra note 10. 
14 See generally Goodenough, supra note 8. 
15 See Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade (SAGIT), NEW 
STRATEGIES FOR CULTURE AND TRADE: CANADIAN CULTURE IN A GLOBAL WORLD [hereinafter 
SAGIT Report] (Feb. 1999), “How Do Canada’s Cultural Policies Compare with Those of Other 
5Hollywood, of course, loathes such policies.  The MPA was established in 
1945 in part “to respond to the rising tide of protectionism resulting in barriers 
aimed at restricting the importation of American films,”16 and has made amply 
sure that Congress understands that what they term “the content industries” 
(film, television, home video, publishing, software) “are America’s most 
successful exporters,” with higher international revenues than any other 
industry, and “creat[ing] jobs in the United States at three times the rate of the 
rest of the economy.”17 In 2001 the U.S. audiovisual industry made over $530 
billion (over 5 percent of gross domestic product) and exported $90 billion worth 
of its products to other countries.18 The MPAA’s long-time (former) leader, Jack 
Valenti, who would be recognized by the mid-1990s as the “most formidable 
trade lobbyist” in the United States,19 liked to describe these industries as “the 
jewel in America’s trade crown.”20 
Given the demonstrated export value of these “content industries” and their 
magnitude relative to the overall U.S. economy, U.S. trade negotiators have 
enthusiastically responded to the MPAA’s call, pushing hard over the course of 
recent decades for the maximum degree of audiovisual trade liberalization 
attainable – wherever they can get it.  At virtually every turn, however, they 
have met concerted opposition.  Though desirous of U.S. market access, other 
countries negotiating trade deals with the United States often express strong 
resistance to perceived U.S. media domination, and a desire to minimize the 
cultural homogenization popularly associated with globalization.  Thus U.S. 
trade negotiators’ results in liberalizing the audiovisual sector have been mixed 
at best, their successes to date reflecting not a meeting of the minds so much as 
varying levels of leverage over various counterparties in differing fora.  For 
example, the United States has essentially had its way in bilateral trade 
 
Countries?,” available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/canculture-en.asp? (accessed Aug. 
28, 2006). 
16 MPAA, About Us, supra note 11. 
17 Bonnie J.K. Richardson, Vice President, Trade & Federal Affairs, Motion Picture Association of 
America, Testimony before the House Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade 
& Consumer Protection, May 22, 2001. 
18 Joe Middleton, The Effectiveness of Audiovisual Regulation Inside the European Union:  The 
Television Without Frontiers Directive and Cultural Protectionism, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 607, 
608 (2003), available at Lexis. 
19 Vincent Cable, The New Trade Agenda:  Universal Rules Amid Cultural Diversity, 72 INT’L AFF. 227, 
235 (1996), available at JSTOR; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 116 (Penguin 
Press 2004) (“In his almost forty years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as 
perhaps the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.”). 
20 Richardson, supra note 17 (quoting Valenti, internal quotation marks omitted). 
6negotiations with weaker countries; found mixed success in the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), under which Canada preserved its “culture 
exception” from the pre-existing bilateral agreement, though explicitly subject to 
retaliation by the United States should Canada use it; and essentially been 
stymied in multilateral negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
where the best it could do was an “agreement to disagree” – formalizing the 
parties’ commitment to continue good faith negotiation toward liberalization 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).21 
The differences in perspective could not be more stark.  So far as the MPAA 
and U.S. government officials are concerned, films, television shows, and the like 
are simply entertainment commodities.  The reason they sell well abroad, 
according to this view, is because discerning global consumers voting with their 
money deem American products superior.22 And as such, there is no reason they 
should not be governed by the multilateral trade regime.  Viewed through this 
lens, any attempt to “protect” domestic cultural products23 from international 
competition would appear suspect – not only as inefficient “protectionism” (used 
pejoratively), but also by reference to widely accepted human rights-based 
principles of free speech and access to ideas.24 The prevailing view in many 
other countries, meanwhile, is that cultural products should be conceptualized 
not as commodities like any other, but as a special category of products 
significantly impacting cultural development and national identity.  As the 
authors of an influential Canadian-government-sponsored report posed the issue 
 
21 See infra part III. 
22 See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 18, at 614 (“Jack Valenti, the former president of the [MPAA] has 
argued that Europeans prefer American programming, claiming that Europeans ‘like, admire, 
and patronize what we offer them.’”). 
23 I follow the convention, employed elsewhere, of referring to cultural goods and services 
collectively as “cultural products.”  See, e.g., SAGIT, supra note 15, “Pressures for Change.”  
Drawing a clear, categorical distinction between “goods” and “services” has presented a vexing 
problem in the trade realm.  The Economist has, perhaps glibly, defined “services” as “[p]roducts 
of economic activity that you can’t drop on your foot.”  The Economist, Economics A-Z, 
“Services,” available at 
http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?term=services (accessed Sept. 28, 
2006).  The WTO Appellate Body has stated that a given product might contain attributes both of 
goods and of services, and that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services might both apply to a given product.  See Appellate Body 
Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, at 17, 19, WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997). 
24 See, e.g., Krista Boryskavich & Aaron Bowler, Hollywood North:  Tax Incentives and the Film 
Industry in Canada, 2 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 25, 26 (2002), available at Lexis; U.S. 
Ambassador to UNESCO Louise Oliver Speaks With Foreign Journalists, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 8, 
2005, available at Lexis; Richardson, supra note 17. 
7in 1999, “[d]o we define ourselves simply as the producers and consumers of 
tradeable goods and services?  Or are we prepared to … reaffirm the importance 
of cultural diversity and the ability of each country to ensure that its own stories 
and experiences are available both to its own citizens and to the rest of the 
world?”  Pursuing the latter course, Canada’s “cultural policy” has aimed “to 
foster an environment in which Canada’s cultural products are created, 
produced, marketed, preserved and shared with audiences at home and abroad” 
– a policy both requiring and legitimating insulation of Canadian cultural 
products from unfettered competition under a liberalized trade regime.25 Europe 
(notably, France) has generally shared this viewpoint and embraced a 
substantially similar protectionist policy, though with the added complexity of 
ensuring not only viable domestic cultural spaces, but also the coalescence of a 
nascent European identity.26 
Against this backdrop, an extraordinary legal instrument purporting to 
govern the pursuit of “cultural diversity” has been negotiated – and 
overwhelmingly approved – in an unlikely forum.  By a vote of 148 to 2 (with 4 
abstentions), the “Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions” (the Culture Convention) was adopted on October 20, 
2005 by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO).27 To be clear, the document is not a 
“statement” or “declaration” or “recommendation”; it is a treaty, and by its terms 
becomes binding international law for the countries that ratify it three months 
after thirty countries have done so.28 The thirtieth ratification having been 
deposited on December 18, 2006, the Culture Convention takes effect March 18, 
2007.29 The United States, which (along with Israel) voted against the Culture 
 
25 SAGIT, supra note 15; see also infra parts III.B and V.A. 
26 See generally Middleton, supra note 18 (discussing the EU’s Television Without Frontiers 
Directive); Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament Towards an international instrument on cultural diversity 
[hereinafter Communication to the Council and the European Parliament], COM(2003) 520 final (Aug. 
28, 2003); European Parliament resolution on preserving and promoting cultural diversity:  the 
role of the European regions and international organisations such as UNESCO and the Council of 
Europe, EUR. PARL. DOC. P5_TA(2004)0022 (2004); European Parliament resolution on working 
towards a Convention on the protection of the diversity of cultural content and artistic 
expression, EUR. PARL. DOC. P_TA(2005)0135 (2005); see also infra parts III.C and V.B. 
27 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Oct. 20, 
2005 [hereinafter Culture Convention]. 
28 Id., art. 29. 
29 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions:  States Parties,
available at http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention_p.asp?order=alpha&language=E&KO=31038 
(accessed Jan. 17, 2007).   
8Convention,30 obviously will not be bound by its terms.  That does not, however, 
mean that the United States will not be impacted by it.  Not only does the 
Convention “reaffirm [the] sovereign right to formulate and implement … 
cultural policies and to adopt measures to protect and promote the diversity of 
cultural expressions,” but it also takes aim at other international instruments that 
might impede the exercise of such rights,31 widely understood to mean 
international trade agreements.32
As a legal instrument, the Convention is – by any measure – a muddle.  As 
U.S. officials have lamented, the Culture Convention offers no definitions for 
“culture” and “cultural identity,” key concepts upon which the operative terms 
and central rights and obligations of the document are constructed.33 As a 
consequence, the scope of the document’s application is hard to predict.  As 
Louise Oliver, the United States’ Ambassador to UNESCO, observed, “the 
French and others are expanding the lists of cultural objects … to now include 
wine and foie gras…. And therefore, for us, a question would be where will it 
end?”34 
And as if the Convention’s conceptual indeterminacy were not vexing 
enough for U.S. policymakers, the article on its relationship to other international 
legal instruments is confusing and apparently contradictory.  While stating that 
“[n]othing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying rights and 
obligations of the Parties under any other treaties to which they are parties,” it 
also states that, “without subordinating this Convention to any other treaty,” the 
parties are obliged “when interpreting and applying the other treaties to which 
they are parties or when entering into other international obligations, … [to] take 
into account the relevant provisions of this Convention.”35 Oliver expressed 
concern that such provisions “could be misinterpreted to undermine the clear 
and unambiguous obligations undertaken by governments in other international 
agreements, such as in the fields of human rights or trade,”36 though she omits to 
note the relatively clear provisions barring invocation of the Convention “in 
order to infringe human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the 
 
30 See Alan Riding, U.S. backs Hollywood at Unesco; It votes against plan to fight globalization on the 
cultural level, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 22, 2005, available at Lexis.  The four abstaining countries 
were Australia, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Liberia.  Id. 
31 Culture Convention, supra note 27, arts. 5, 20. 
32 See infra part V. 
33 Culture Convention, supra note 27, art. 4. 
34 U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO Louise Oliver Speaks With Foreign Journalists, supra note 24. 
35 Culture Convention, supra note 27, art. 20. 
36 U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO Louise Oliver Speaks With Foreign Journalists, supra note 24. 
9Universal Declaration of Human Rights or guaranteed by international law, or to 
limit the scope thereof.”37 What we are really talking about, then, is trade 
agreements (for which the Convention includes no such carve-out), and on this 
score, the Convention’s relation to existing international legal obligations is far 
from obvious. 
The political meaning of the Convention, however, is considerably more 
clear.  As one commentator has observed, whereas France may have been seen as 
the “lunatic fringe” in the 1990s for its strenuous opposition to bringing cultural 
products within the scope of WTO negotiations, the Culture Convention’s 
resounding approval – including by the United Kingdom and other close U.S. 
allies – “shows that international opinion has swung into line with them since.”38 
As this paper will argue, it is in large part by reference to the dynamics of 
diplomacy, domestic politics, and on-going negotiation – and not solely as a legal 
instrument taking its place amidst existing international legal obligations – that 
we can best make sense of this otherwise opaque and contradictory document.  
Indeed, viewed within a broader historical context, UNESCO’s Culture 
Convention is strikingly consistent with the approach to globalization long 
pursued by so-called “middle powers” like France and Canada (the Convention’s 
principal proponents).  To the degree they have embraced economic and 
financial globalization, they have typically done so through regimes thought 
capable of curbing its excesses – by and large associated with America’s power 
and influence – and ensuring their representation at the table.39 
This paper aims to identify the Culture Convention’s true legal and 
diplomatic significance.  Starting with a brief look at theoretical and practical 
conceptions of “culture,” the paper then examines the treatment of cultural 
products in the WTO system, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the 
nascent Free Trade Area of the Americas, the European Union, and in recent 
bilateral trade agreements involving the United States.  The paper then traces the 
history of UNESCO and its efforts toward the preservation of cultural diversity, 
including the United States’ cool relationship with this UN body.  The origins, 
negotiation and drafting of the Culture Convention are then examined, with 
special attention paid to the efforts of Canada, France, and the European Union 
to ensure its adoption.  The paper concludes that the Culture Convention will 
 
37 Culture Convention, supra note 27, art. 1. 
38 See James, supra note 10. 
39 See infra part V; cf., generally, RAWI ABDELAL, CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL 
FINANCE (forthcoming Feb. 2007) (contrasting America’s preference for “ad hoc globalization” 
with France’s preference for “managed globalization” and tracing their effects in the 
liberalization of capital flows under various regimes). 
10 
likely have little effect on existing trade obligations, but that it will have a 
significant impact on future negotiations toward greater audiovisual 
liberalization under the WTO system – a major trade policy goal of the United 
States.   
The efficacy of the Culture Convention as a means of resisting audiovisual 
trade liberalization will ultimately depend on the perceived normative 
legitimacy of the broader argument for the protection of cultural diversity 
through domestic protectionist measures.  The final sections of the paper address 
the trade and culture debate in these broader terms.  Based on an examination of 
the media market, Hollywood’s prevailing business model, and the construction 
of trade rhetoric and deployment of human rights arguments by U.S. trade 
negotiators and corporate interests, I argue that the burden remains squarely on 
the United States to demonstrate that the liberalization of trade in cultural 
products is in fact necessary or desirable.  
The Culture Convention can perhaps afford to be so vague on its relation to 
existing trade obligations precisely because it is not really about existing trade 
obligations at all.  The purpose of the Culture Convention is to put a brake on 
future liberalization of culturally sensitive products – notably under the GATS 
regime.  In substance it is equal parts political declaration and negotiating 
tactic.40 Though ostensibly a legal instrument purporting to regulate “cultural” 
policies and disputes that may arise, in political and diplomatic terms it need be 
no more specific or articulate than, say, France’s no-vote on the proposed EU 
constitution.41 First and foremost, it is an expression of dissatisfaction with the 
direction in which cultural globalization is perceived to move, and as such need 
not say what “culture” and “cultural identity” are because the document is really 
about what they are not.  More specifically, in the view of the 148 countries that 
voted for it, it is a rejection of the market as sole arbiter of cultural content 
worthy of creation and transmission.   
Though easily dismissed as anti-Americanism,42 it is better described as non-
Americanism – but that of a very specific sort.  As described below, U.S. 
 
40 See infra parts V and VI. 
41 For background, see generally Richard E. Baldwin, Trail to Failure:  History of the Constitutional 
Treaty’s Rejection and Implications for the Future, Centre for European Policy Studies Policy Brief 
No. 104, May 2006, available at http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1332 (accessed Sept. 7, 
2006). 
42 See, e.g., Frederick Scott Galt, Note, The Life, Death, and Rebirth of the “Cultural Exception” in the 
Multilateral Trading System:  An Evolutionary Analysis of Cultural Protection and Intervention in the 
Face of American Pop Culture’s Hegemony, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 909, 920-21 (2004), 
available at Lexis. 
11 
policymakers and corporate interests strain to frame the debate by reference to 
established universal norms and obligations, notably human rights principles, 
and would-be universal norms and obligations, notably trade principles, in order 
to obfuscate the fact that this is really about future negotiations regarding 
potential further liberalization.  The true subject matter of the Convention is a 
terrain that, by hypothesis, remains politically and diplomatically contestable.  
And the evil feared, it turns out, is not really “America” at all; Hollywood 
represents a quintessentially global business model, if one that could only have 
taken root in the United States.43
Hollywood, it turns out, is both further from and closer to Cannes than we 
might have thought. 
II. Culture and National Identity:  Imagined and Re-Imagined 
The drafters of the Culture Convention might take solace in the fact that, if 
they failed to identify clear and comprehensive definitions of “culture” and 
“cultural identity,” so has everyone else.  Whether modes of cultural production 
can be identified, and whether they can be made the subject of useful regulation 
are, however, distinct questions.   
A. The Elusive Concept of Culture 
In his seminal work on the phenomenon of nationalism, Benedict Anderson 
argued that whatever else nations (“notoriously difficult to define”) might be, 
they are fundamentally “imagined” communities.  They are imagined, he 
observes, in the literal sense that “members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members.”  Furthermore, they are imagined in the 
minds of their constituents to be “limited” in the sense that they are assumed to 
have “finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations”; to be 
“sovereign” in the post-Enlightenment sense that they “dream of being free, and, 
if under God, directly so”; and to be a “community” in that, “regardless of the 
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”44 At the core of one’s sense of 
national identity lay these essentially imaginary parameters of association. 
Others such as cultural theorist Homi Bhabha, building on Anderson’s work, 
have emphasized the “ambivalence of modern society” that lies at its heart, an 
equivocal posture resulting in part from the “conceptual indeterminacy” of 
national identity itself.  To the degree that language and art endeavor to 
 
43 See infra part VI.B. 
44 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF 
NATIONALISM 3, 6-7 (revised ed., Verso 2000) (1983) (emphasis omitted). 
12 
represent the national culture, they also construct and alter it.  Bhabha sees in a 
nation’s art “the nation-space in the process of the articulation of elements:  where 
meanings may be partial because they are in medias res; and history may be half-
made because it is in the process of being made; and the image of cultural 
authority may be ambivalent because it is caught, uncertainly, in the act of 
‘composing’ its powerful image.”  The critical perspective that Bhabha terms 
“nation as narration” endeavors to shine a bright light on “the cultural 
boundaries of the nation” precisely to reveal the fluidity and indeterminacy that 
emerge in all efforts to articulate what the nation actually is.  Cultural boundaries 
are “Janus-faced and the problem of outside/inside must always itself be a 
process of hybridity, incorporating new ‘people’ in relation to the body politic, 
generating other sites of meaning and, inevitably, in the political process, 
producing unmanned sites of political antagonism and unpredictable forces for 
political representation.”45
Though no diplomat or trade negotiator in the U.S. government would likely 
put it in such terms, the basic idea – the fundamental fluidity, hybridity, and 
indeterminacy of any national culture – does a lot of rhetorical work to advance 
the U.S. position on trade in cultural products.  Ambassador Oliver, for example, 
has emphasized that the “United States, the most culturally diverse country in 
the world, is a vigorous proponent of cultural diversity,”46 and argued (in 
explaining the United States’ no-vote on the Culture Convention) that the 
“United States has achieved the vibrant cultural diversity that so enriches our 
society by our commitment to freedom and our openness to others, and by 
maintaining the utmost respect for the free flow of ideas, words, goods and 
services.”47 Put differently, if “cultural diversity” is hybridity, then the most 
direct and comprehensive means of achieving cultural diversity is the 
dismantling of border impediments to “the free flow of ideas, words, goods and 
services.”  A crucial assumption, of course, is that the desired “diversity” would 
continue to exist in a wholly liberalized market, an assumption examined 
below.48 But for the moment, observe the ease with which trade, human rights, 
 
45 Homi K. Bhabha, “Narrating the Nation,” in NATIONS AND IDENTITIES 359-63 (Vincent P. Pecora 
ed., Blackwell Publishers 2001). 
46 Ambassador Louise V. Oliver, Statement to 172nd UNESCO Executive Board, Sept. 20, 2005, 
available at http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/53915.htm (accessed Sept. 7, 2006). 
47 Ambassador Louise V. Oliver, Statement to 33rd UNESCO General Conference, Explanation of 
Vote of the United States on the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions, at 1, Oct. 20, 2005, available at 
http://www.usunesco.org/texts/GenConf33_Amb_Intervention_CD_Vote.pdf (accessed Sept. 7, 
2006). 
48 See infra part VI. 
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and cultural terminology flow together in this formulation, implicitly aligning 
with the angels Hollywood’s economic interest in unfettered markets.   
So what does UNESCO – presumably the UN’s authority on the matter – 
think “culture” means?  Helpfully, UNESCO has assembled a list of “Questions 
and Answers” on the intersection of trade and culture, though “culture” itself 
remains undefined.  The omission is unsurprising, given the de facto impossibility 
of doing so in any clear and comprehensive way, which appears to be a principal 
upshot of the cultural studies literature (at least from a lawyer’s point of view).  
UNESCO does offer a narrative description of “cultural industries,” though these 
are defined circularly as “those industries that combine the creation, production 
and commercialisation of contents which are intangible and cultural in nature.”  
“Cultural goods” are unhelpfully described as “those consumer goods [that] 
convey ideas, symbols, and ways of life” (though a list of examples is provided, 
including books, magazines, multimedia, software, records, films, videos, 
audiovisual programs, crafts, and fashion).  “Cultural services” are, predictably, 
services that aim at “satisfying cultural interests or needs.”49 The indeterminacy 
of “culture” and related concepts would appear to work strongly in favor of the 
American view; the United States need not define them because the impulse is 
deregulatory.  If in fact regulating “cultural industries” requires defining culture 
(a question taken up below), UNESCO would appear to be in big trouble.   
In any event, while UNESCO may have a hard time saying precisely what 
makes certain industries, goods, and services “cultural” in the pertinent sense, it 
has less trouble quantifying the economic impact of the industries identified as 
examples.  UNESCO observes that flows in this area have “grown exponentially” 
over recent decades, with “annual world trade of printed matter, literature, 
music, visual arts, cinema, photography, radio, television, games and sporting 
goods surg[ing] from US$95.340 to $387.927 millions” between 1980 and 1998.  
The extraordinary “global reach of the North American film industry” is likewise 
observed, Hollywood reportedly bringing in half of its revenues overseas – up 
from 30 percent in 1980.50 
As it happens, the gesture toward economic impacts suggests – if 
inadvertently – a potential clarification of what we actually mean when we talk 
about “culture” in the context of trade.  Oliver Goodenough has distinguished 
 
49 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [hereinafter UNESCO], 
Culture, trade and globalisation:  Questions and Answers, nos. 1, 2, available at 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/industries/trade/html_eng/question.shtml (accessed Aug. 31, 
2006). 
50 Id., nos. 3, 4. 
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between “high” culture, by which he refers to “opera, ballet, classical music,” 
and the like, and “popular” culture, “such as entertainment film and television, 
pop music, popular fiction, popular journalism, ‘soft’ news, and commercial 
architecture.”  Though certainly “neither fully descriptive nor fully discrete,” 
Goodenough’s distinction does permit a refinement of the debate.  As he 
observes, “the fight here is seldom over ‘high’ culture.”  The United States, like 
many other nations, “openly subsidize[s] opera, ballet and fine arts and nobody 
complains.”  What is really at stake is control over the flow of, and capacity to 
profit from, popular culture.  “This is the intrusive stuff, and this is where there 
is money at stake.”51 
Viewed in this light, a precise definition of “culture” would appear to be less 
crucial.  The legal and normative legitimacy of national governments 
undertaking to identify and protect such industries is addressed below,52 but for 
the moment it will suffice to observe that what we are after is less a 
comprehensive concept of “culture” than a pragmatic delineation of industries, 
the broad-stroke cultural impact – and profit potential – of which are substantial 
enough both to lead well-healed producers to look abroad for new markets, and 
to lead cultural ministries and trade negotiators to think twice before allowing 
them in.   
 B. Knowing Culture Backward and Forward 
Before turning to the degree of recognition currently accorded cultural 
products under existing trade regimes, however, there is an additional 
refinement of the “culture” concept that serves further to clarify what is – and 
what is not – at stake in the debate about trade and culture.  C. Edwin Baker has 
observed that free trade advocates “typically invoke … a ‘museum,’ 
‘commodity,’ or ‘artifact’ conception of culture,” which implicitly characterizes 
claims regarding cultural values as “relatively static, largely backward-looking, 
and very much content-oriented.”  If this is what “culture” means, then 
protectionist policies are vulnerable to the charge that they represent an effort by 
the powerful – who may benefit from prevailing conceptions of national culture 
 
51 Goodenough, supra note 8, at 209-10.  Goodenough further identifies a third category, termed 
“ethnic” culture, “such as ‘folk’ music, ‘folk’ dance, story-telling and folklore, ‘traditional’ arts, 
craftwork, and vernacular architecture.”  Id. at 209.  See also Alan Riding, American culture:  A 
French appreciation, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 28, 2006, at 8, available at Lexis (observing that 
“nonprofit foundations, philanthropists, corporate sponsors, universities and community 
organizations” that promote cultural undertakings in the United States “in practice do receive 
indirect government support in the form of tax incentives”). 
52 See infra part VI. 
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– to keep out the winds of “liberating change” from abroad.53 In actuality, 
however, cultural protectionism is typically underwritten by a very different 
notion, which Baker terms “the ‘discourse’ or ‘dialogic’ conception of culture.”  
Used in this way, “culture” refers to “a living practice” in which “it matters who 
the speaker and who the audience are,” though others to be sure may listen and 
find universal value in what is communicated.  An element of shared “heritage” 
is relevant, but only as a conceptual context for “discourses of identity and 
value” in the present and future.  The cultural protectionist, then, aims not to 
protect “specific, backward-looking content,” but rather “to assure an adequate 
context for participation in cultural, social, and democratic dialogue and to 
provide resources needed for dialogic participation by all members of the 
cultural community” – including “meaningful opportunities to be cultural 
‘speakers.’”54 
Thus it would appear that pro-trade and protectionist voices in the trade and 
culture debate essentially speak past one another, though as it is the actions of 
protectionists that tend to be the principal subject of debate, one might rather 
describe this state of affairs as an obfuscation of what is actually going on, and 
what is actually at stake, by pro-traders in particular.  Deriving substantial 
rhetorical benefit from the ultimate indeterminacy of “culture,” pro-traders 
emphasize the resulting inability to define precisely what protectionists would 
have us regulate, looking past the fact that there is actually a relatively discrete 
set of popular-cultural industries to which cultural protectionists direct their 
strongest claims.  And deriving political benefit from the characterization of 
cultural protectionists as power-hungry mind-controllers endeavoring to keep 
foreign influences out in order to perfect a static, self-serving conception of 
national culture, they likewise ignore that cultural protectionist arguments tend 
to be forward-looking and discourse-oriented, aiming at the creation of speech 
opportunities where market forces might have precluded them.55 
53 C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 249-50 (New York:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). 
54 Id. at 250-51.  Sarah Owen-Vandersluis has similarly drawn a distinction between “market-
based” and “community-based” modes of cultural policy, the difference lying (at least in part) in 
the presumed means of preference formation – the former emphasizing the individual and the 
latter emphasizing participation in the collective construction of culture. See SARAH OWEN-
VANDERSLUIS, ETHICS AND CULTURAL POLICY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 27-41 (2003).   
55 It has been observed that the identification of autonomy and meaningful choice with unfettered 
market exchange is deeply embedded in the psychology of welfare economics.  See, e.g, OWEN-
VANDERSLUIS, supra note 54, at 40-49.  It should be observed, however, that this is not inconsistent 
with the claim that the rhetoric of liberalism has been consciously deployed in a strategic manner, 
as this paper will argue infra.
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III. The “Culture Exception” and Agreeing to Disagree 
Literally hundreds of trade agreements – bilateral, regional, and multilateral – 
have been negotiated over recent decades,56 and their treatment of cultural 
products differs as greatly as the historical circumstances, national interests, and 
relative negotiating leverage of the parties that have entered into them. 
A. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, originally signed in 1947 and 
incorporated into the WTO agreements (along with various protocols and 
understandings, the GATT), forms the historical and conceptual core of the 
world trading system.57 The most important undertakings that a country makes 
pursuant to the GATT are so-called “most-favoured-nation treatment” (MFN) 
and “national treatment” under Articles I and III, respectively.  MFN treatment 
requires generally that “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted 
by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”58 In 
other words, the best treatment extended to any has to be extended to all.  
National treatment, then, provides generally that “products of the territory of 
any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party 
shall not be subject … to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in 
excess of those applied … to like domestic products.”59 In other words, do unto 
others as you do unto yourself.  Terms such as “like products” obviously leave 
ample room to litigate,60 but the basic commitments are conceptually 
straightforward.   
The GATT, since its inception in 1947, has included provisions ostensibly 
giving national governments some room to maneuver when it comes to cultural 
 
56 In addition to the WTO agreements themselves, the WTO indicates that the GATT received 
notifications of 124 regional trade agreements (including bilaterals) between 1948 and 1994, and 
that the WTO, since its creation in 1995, has received notification of over 130 more.  See World 
Trade Organization, Regional Trade Agreements:  Facts and figures, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm (accessed Sept. 13, 2006).  For lists of 
these agreements, see World Trade Organization, Regional Trade Agreements, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (accessed Sept. 13, 2006). 
57 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 [hereinafter GATT], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A.  
58 Id., art. I:1. 
59 Id., art. III:2. 
60 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 
1996) (among other things, affirming a Panel’s finding that shochu and vodka are “like products” 
and that Japan violated GATT Article III:2 by taxing imported vodka more heavily). 
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goods.  Article IV permits “screen quotas” that “require the exhibition of 
cinematograph films of national origin during a specified minimum proportion 
of the total screen time actually utilized … in the commercial exhibition of all 
films of whatever origin.”61 This provision reflects the fact that the film industry 
in Europe, “slowly recovering from the devastation of World War II” at the time 
of the GATT’s signing, had just witnessed the post-war release of years of pent-
up Hollywood supply – literally thousands of American films – that had not 
been previously released in Europe due to the war.62 Additionally, Article XX 
includes more broadly worded language creating a general exception for 
measures “necessary to protect public morals” and those “imposed for the 
protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value.”63 
It would be quite a stretch, however, to characterize such provisions as 
creating a “culture exception” from the GATT regime.  The more explicit of these 
provisions applies specifically to “commercial exhibition” of films, suggesting 
that this exception should not even reach, say, televised films, let alone made-for-
television programming.64 And the more general exception for protecting 
“national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value” would not appear 
to embrace the category of “popular” culture very comfortably.65 Actual “culture 
exceptions” would come only later, and in regional settings. 
B. Free Trade in North America 
Something approaching a true culture exception appears in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as between Canada and each of the 
United States and Mexico (but interestingly, not as between the United States 
and Mexico).  Its practical utility to Canada is substantially undercut, however, 
by an accompanying provision of the agreement. 
 
61 GATT, supra note 57, art. IV(a). 
62 See Hernan Galperin, Cultural Industries in the Age of Free-Trade Agreements, 24 CAN. J. COMM.
(1999), available at http://info.wlu.ca/~wwwpress/jrls/cjc/BackIssues/24.1/galperin.pap.html 
(accessed Aug. 30, 2006). 
63 GATT, supra note 57, art. XX(a), (f).  The GATT also includes a general safety-valve provision 
permitting the suspension of obligations under certain circumstances where imports “cause or 
threaten serious injury to domestic producers … of like or directly competitive products.”  Id., art. 
XIX. 
64 See Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The Cultural Exception:  Does It Exist in GATT and GATS 
Frameworks?  How Does It Affect Or Is It Affected By the Agreement on TRIPS?, 15 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 281, 287-89 (1997), available at Lexis; see also Galt, supra note 42, at 912. 
65 See Galt, supra note 42, at 913.  This general exception has, however, been read aggressively by 
some to embrace “copyrightable goods.”  See Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 64, at 284-85. 
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In the pre-existing Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), negotiated 
under the pro-market administrations of Ronald Reagan and Brian Mulroney, a 
broadly worded culture exception was coupled with a provision permitting 
retaliation for its use.66 Article 2005 of the CUSFTA provides generally that 
“[c]ultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agreement,” but 
that either party could nevertheless “take measures of equivalent commercial 
effect in response to [such] actions.”67 The practical upshot was that an exception 
intended to comfort the Canadian cultural sector was effectively blunted by a 
mechanism ensuring that cultural products would be treated like others.68
The NAFTA goes no further than the CUSFTA did, simply incorporating by 
reference the aforementioned provisions of the prior agreement.  NAFTA Article 
2106 and the accompanying annex provide generally that cultural industries, as 
between Canada and each of the United States and Mexico (but not as between 
the latter two parties69), would be governed by the applicable provisions of the 
CUSFTA70 – including the retaliation provision.  While Canada has argued that 
the United States’ capacity to retaliate under NAFTA should be limited to 
Canadian measures that would violate the CUSFTA, which did not extend to 
audiovisual services and intellectual property rights, U.S. officials have rejected 
this interpretation and have not shied away from threatening retaliation in the 
 
66 See Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 24, at 28-30. 
67 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter CUSFTA], art. 2005, Jan. 2, 1988, available at 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/cusfta-e.pdf (accessed Sept. 14, 2006).  See also 
id., art. 2012 (defining “cultural industry”). 
68 See Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 24, at 30. 
69 Galperin suggests that Mexico’s relative lack of concern regarding U.S. cultural products results 
from “a combination of relatively strong domestic industries, the limited appeal of American 
products in some sectors due to cultural distance factors, and the neoliberal orientation of its 
communication policies.”  Galperin, supra note 62. 
70 North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA], art. 2106 and Annex 2106, Dec. 
17, 1992, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=78 
(accessed Sept. 14, 2006).  For additional background on Canada’s cultural policies and the range 
of international agreements impacting Canada’s cultural products, see Media Awareness 
Network, Canadian Content Rules (Cancon), available at http://www.media-
awareness.ca/english/issues/cultural_policies/canadian_content_rules.cfm (accessed Aug. 31, 
2006); Media Awareness Network, Canada’s Cultural Policies, available at http://www.media-
awareness.ca/english/issues/cultural_policies/canada_cultural_policies.cfm (accessed Aug. 31, 
2006); Media Awareness Network, International Agreements and Canadian Identity, available at 
http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/issues/cultural_policies/international_agreements.cfm 
(accessed Aug. 31, 2006); Media Awareness Network, Media and Canadian Cultural Policies 
Chronology, available at http://www.media-
awareness.ca/english/issues/cultural_policies/cultural_policy_chronology.cfm (accessed Aug. 31, 
2006). 
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audiovisual sector.71 Indeed, it has been observed that the capacity to retaliate in 
the cultural products context under the NAFTA is even more substantial than in 
other areas, in that retaliation is “only available under normal trade rules after a 
process of dispute settlement and the opportunity to remedy the offending action 
or to offer compensation.”72 Moreover, it is widely agreed that retaliatory action 
is not limited to such cultural industries themselves,73 such that the United States 
would be permitted to impose a de facto tax-and-transfer within Canada, for the 
benefit of Canada’s cultural industries, and to the detriment of whatever 
industry the United States decided to hit – presumably chosen to maximize the 
detriment to Canadian interests overall.74 
More recently, Canada has continued to advocate substantial latitude for 
domestic cultural policies in a broader “regional” forum.  The Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA), which would create a free trade area embracing the 34 
democratic countries of the Western Hemisphere (thus excluding Cuba), has 
been under negotiation since 1994, and has foundered on a number of 
contentious trade and related issues.75 Among other things, Canada has insisted 
that language on cultural products be included in the FTAA’s preamble, and has 
further advocated a comprehensive culture exception,76 both of which appear 
(bracketed) in the current FTAA draft.77 
71 See W. A. Dymond & Michael M. Hart, Abundant Paradox:  The Trade and Culture Debate (Nov. 
2001), at 5-6, available at http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl/pdf/papers/culture.pdf (accessed Aug. 29, 
2006); Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 64, at 308-10. 
72 Dymond & Hart, supra note 71, at 5. 
73 See Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 64, at 310. 
74 See, e.g., OWEN-VANDERSLUIS, supra note 54, at 142 (observing that retaliation against Canada 
threatened by the United States in connection with a dispute over trade in periodicals would 
have applied “across-the-board …, including key sectors such as steel and finance,” an approach 
“meant to create divisions within Canadian society” and bring internal pressure to bear upon the 
Canadian government). 
75 See generally Christopher M. Bruner, Hemispheric Integration and the Politics of Regionalism:  The 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
76 See Cultural Diversity in the FTAA – Canada’s Position (updated Oct. 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/C-P&P-en.asp (accessed Aug. 28, 2006);  Cultural Diversity 
in the FTAA – Canada’s Position:  Government of Canada Paper on Cultural Diversity in the FTAA 
Negotiations (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/cpp_neg-en.asp? 
(accessed Aug. 28, 2006); Canada’s Proposal for a Cultural Exemption (updated Sept. 23, 2003), 
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/FTAA/culture-en.asp (accessed Aug. 28, 2006). 
77 Free Trade Area of the Americas Draft Agreement, Preamble, ch. XXII art. 7, Nov. 21, 2003, 
available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index_e.asp (accessed Aug. 29, 2006). 
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C. The European Union:  Unity and Diversity 
It would not be an overstatement to say that cultural concerns lay at the very 
heart of the European project, though European cultural policies reflect an 
uneasy division of competencies between national and continental authorities. 
Article 151 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community provides that 
the Community “shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member 
States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same 
time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore”78 – generally referred to 
as the principle of “unity in diversity.”79 Articulating wherein that “unity” 
resides, however – or more precisely, saying what it means to be “European” – 
has proven difficult.  Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union provides that 
any “European” country “may apply to become a member of the Union,”80 
though “European” is never defined, and some have contended that the 
European Union (EU) “needs a stronger identity to be viable.”81 The theme of 
“unity in diversity” is also emphasized in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, the preamble of which notes the “common values” of 
Europe – including “human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity,” as well as 
“principles of democracy and the rule of law” – and characterizes the EU as 
“contribut[ing] to the preservation and to the development of these common 
values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples 
of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States.”82 The Charter 
affirms both “the right to freedom of expression,” including the freedom “to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers,” while at the same time stating that the EU 
“shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.”83 
The project of European integration has long been marked by the struggle to 
forge a coherent European identity, and one of the means through which 
policymakers have endeavored to achieve this is through a continental 
 
78 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 151, Dec. 24, 
2002, 2002 O.J. (C325/33). 
79 EurActiv, European values and identity, updated May 23, 2006, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/constitution/eurpean-values-identity/article-154441?_print (accessed 
Aug. 24, 2006). 
80 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 49, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. 
(C325/5). 
81 EurActiv, European values and identity, supra note 79. 
82 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Preamble, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. 
(C364/8). 
83 Id., arts. 11:1, 22. 
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audiovisual policy embodied in the “Television Without Frontiers” Directive.84 
According to a preceding green paper, both unity and diversity could be 
achieved through a common liberalized audiovisual policy precisely because 
such an approach would help identify a “common European heritage” as 
broadcasters competed for pan-European audience share.85 In practice, however, 
the liberalization of European audiovisual markets has not resulted in the 
coalescence of a truly European media landscape.   As one scholar put it, “the 
idea that the free flow of cultural products would bring to the fore the ‘common 
European identity,’ thus creating a pan-European audience, has proven overly 
simplistic.”86 
Indeed, recent surveys suggest that Europeans still tend to think of 
themselves in predominantly national terms, one study finding that just 47 
percent of respondents considered themselves citizens both of their country and 
Europe, and that 92 percent felt greater attachment to their home countries.87
Ironically, the liberalization of audiovisual policy may have made things worse:  
“European culture, never a well-defined concept to begin with, is becoming the 
culture of those Member States who have the most competitive media 
corporations – France, the United Kingdom, and Germany.”88 Though some, like 
former European Commission President Jacques Delors, urge that Europeans 
 
84 See Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit 
of television broadcasting activities; Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 June 1997 amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning 
the pursuit of television broadcasting activities [hereinafter, together, the Amended TWF 
Directive], each available at http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24101.htm (accessed Sept. 14, 
2006).  Efforts to update and modernize the Television Without Frontiers Directive continue.  See 
Legislative Proposal for an Audiovisual Media Services Directive:  Towards a modern framework for 
audiovisual content, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/avpolicy/reg/tvwf/modernisation/proposal_2005/index_en.htm 
(accessed January 25, 2007). 
85 Galperin, supra note 62 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
86 Id. 
87 See EurActiv, European values and identity, supra note 79. 
88 Middleton, supra note 18, at 625.  Similarly, Owen-Vandersluis observes that the liberalism at 
the heart of the common market project substantially narrows the scope of cultural “diversity” 
compatible with it; there is a level of comfort in “giving primacy to the community and espousing 
diversity precisely because it views liberal values as the only natural basis for that community.”  
Owen-Vandersluis presciently anticipates greater tension, however, as expansion of the 
European Union introduces a degree a cultural “diversity” that increasingly confounds attempts 
to specify the content of the much heralded “European identity.”  OWEN-VANDERSLUIS, supra note 
54, at 171-72. 
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“proceed further in this quest for a European identity,”89 it has remained difficult 
– particularly in light of enlargement concerns – to say what European identity 
might amount to, other than by contrast with America.90 Similarly, regarding the 
failure of a truly European polity to emerge, one observer suggested that a 
“factor that could help” forge such a polity was “growing anxiety among 
Europeans about US hegemony.”91 
Nevertheless the EU, spearheaded by France, has strongly defended at the 
global level the capacity of member states to pursue cultural policies.  As 
described below, the EU steadfastly refused to make liberalization commitments 
on audiovisual services within the WTO framework,92 and the EU Parliament has 
more recently expressed continued support for the European Commission’s 
approach to the Doha round of WTO negotiations, making “no offers of 
liberalisation … in the health, education and audiovisual sectors,” and affirming 
that “each Member State should have the legal flexibility to take all necessary 
measures in the areas of cultural and audiovisual policy so as to preserve and 
promote cultural diversity.”93 
89 Jacques Delors, Europe’s self-doubting also proves to be asset, SUNDAY PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), 
Sept. 17, 2000, at B15, available at Factiva. 
90 See Sarah Lyall, Under One Flag: For young Europeans, identity questions, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
March 5, 2004, available at 
http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2004/03/05/flag5_ed3_.php (accessed Sept. 
6, 2006).  On the failed constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands and the 
relationship to national politics, notably concerns regarding the voting structure in an expanded 
EU, see generally Baldwin, supra note 41.  See also EurActiv, Merkel:  EU needs a rethink, updated 
Aug. 22, 2006, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/agenda2004/merkel-eu-needs-
rethink/article-155193?_print (accessed Aug. 24, 2006) (German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
arguing that “[w]e need the constitutional treaty,” and that including a “catalogue of European 
fundamental values” would help to clarify a European identity, internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Like the treaties it would replace, the proposed constitution is open to “European” 
countries (undefined), and includes the “unity in diversity” principle.  Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, arts. I-58 and III-280, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310/1). 
91 Raphael Minder, ‘Elections fought on Europe-wide themes have failed to materialise,’ FIN. TIMES, June 
7, 2004, at 11.  Minder likewise observes the weakness of the EU Parliament, the only directly 
representative EU institution.  Id.; cf. MICHAEL EFLER & PERCY ROHDE, CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC ASPECTS OF THE EU, English translation of German version for Mehr Demokratie e.V, 
at 17, May 5, 2005, available at http://www.mehr-demokratie.de/fileadmin/bund/pdf/EU-
Kritik_20050505_en.pdf (accessed Sept. 6, 2006) (observing the absence of a truly European polity 
and advocating greater direct democratic participation in EU institutions). 
92 See Galt, supra note 42, at 914. 
93 European Parliament resolution on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) within 
the WTO, including cultural diversity, ¶¶ 6, 12, EUR. PARL. DOC. P_5TA(2003)0087 (2003). 
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D. General Agreement on Trade in Services 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), another agreement 
incorporated into the WTO framework,94 creates obligations more modest in 
scope than those under the GATT – reflecting in large part the influence of 
France in its negotiation.  In the face of “very powerful lobbying from the US film 
industry that market access for its products was a key negotiating issue,”95 
France pushed for the opposite extreme – complete “exclusion of the audiovisual 
sector from GATS talks.”96 Ultimately the parties settled on an uneasy 
“Agreement to Disagree,” under which the audiovisual sector would not be 
formally excluded, but countries could decline to make commitments in the area 
with the understanding that negotiations would resume within five years.97 For 
purposes of on-going negotiations, the WTO has described “audiovisual 
services” as including “motion picture and video tape production and 
distribution services, motion picture projection services, radio and television 
services, radio and television transmission services, [and] sound recording.”98 As 
digital technologies advance, however, the substantive distinction between 
goods and services of this sort appears increasingly arbitrary.99 
94 General Agreement on Trade in Services [hereinafter GATS], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B. 
95 Cable, supra note 19, at 234. 
96 Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 64, at 295.  France played a similar role in the failed effort toward 
a Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI), withdrawing from MAI negotiations with 
concerns regarding labor, the environment, and “particularly … the ability of governments to 
apply policies for the development and promotion of strategic sectors such as cultural 
industries.”  UNESCO, Culture, trade and globalisation:  Questions and Answers, supra note 49, no. 
20. 
97 See Galt, supra note 42, at 914; Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 64, at 291-301; Galperin, supra note 
62, at 15.  Very few commitments affecting popular culture have been made.  See Michael Hahn, 
A Clash of Cultures?  The UNESCO Diversity Convention and International Trade Law, 9 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 515, 526 (2006). 
98 World Trade Organization, Audiovisual services, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/audiovisual_e/audiovisual_e.htm (accessed Oct. 27, 
2005).  The WTO Secretariat has observed that it can be difficult to distinguish “radio and 
television transmission services” characterized as “telecommunications” from those characterized 
as “audiovisual services,” but that as “a general rule of thumb … it has become accepted that 
commitments involving programming content are classified under audiovisual services, while 
those purely involving the transmission of information are classified under telecommunications.”  
World Trade Organization Council for Trade in Services, Audiovisual Services:  Background Note by 
the Secretariat, at 2, S/C/W/40, June 15, 1998. 
99 Michael Hahn observes that it is largely “arbitrary from a policy standpoint that a Hollywood 
blockbuster would be subjected to a completely different legal regime if it was to be projected 
onto foreign screens not from a cinematographic film [a good governed by GATT], but by using 
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Article XVII of the GATS requires that national treatment be extended by a 
country only to services sectors “inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any 
conditions and qualifications set out therein.”100 Article XIX, then, requires that 
“Members shall enter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later 
than five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement and 
periodically thereafter, with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of 
liberalization.”  Crucially, however, Article XIX also includes a limiting principle, 
providing that this “process of liberalization shall take place with due respect for 
national policy objectives.”101 This limiting principle, it is argued below, is 
crucial to understanding the purpose and practical significance of UNESCO’s 
Culture Convention, which above all else speaks to a national policy objective of 
great importance to the countries that adopted it, and further requires that the 
principles it embodies be taken into account in negotiations in other fora.  
 E. Bilateral Trade with the United States 
While multilateral GATS negotiations have taken the so-called “positive” 
approach to liberalization, applying trade disciplines only in those sectors 
explicitly scheduled, the United States far prefers – and in recent bilateral 
negotiations, has pursued – the “negative” approach of imposing broad-reaching 
disciplines and then requiring that any deviations from liberalization be 
scheduled.  In the bilateral negotiation setting, as Ivan Bernier has observed, the 
United States is much better positioned to demand the more comprehensive 
“negative” approach to trade liberalization, and the results are reflected in the 
degree of liberalization secured by the United States in bilateral agreements 
entered since 2002 with Chile, Singapore, Central American countries, Australia, 
and Morocco, respectively.102 
digitally transmitted data sent from some central distribution point [a service governed by 
GATS].”  Hahn, supra note 97, at 527. 
100 GATS, supra note 94, art. XVII:1. 
101 Id., art. XIX:1-2.  Services have been included in WTO negotiations since January 2000, see 
World Trade Organization, Services trade, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm (accessed Sept. 1, 2006), but these 
negotiations were suspended in July 2006 due to lack of overall progress, notably in agriculture.  
See Report of Director-General Pascal Lamy, chair of the Trade Negotiations Committee, to the 
General Council, July 27, 2006, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/tnc_chair_report_27july06_e.htm (accessed Sept. 
1, 2006). 
102 See Ivan Bernier, The Recent Free Trade Agreements of the United States as Illustration of Their New 
Strategy Regarding the Audiovisual Sector, available at http://www.mcc.gouv.qc.ca/diversite-
culturelle/eng/pdf/conf_seoul_ang_2004.pdf (accessed Sept. 15, 2006). 
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Beyond use of the negative approach, Bernier identifies some interesting 
trends that emerge in these negotiations.  First, the United States has gladly 
permitted limited reservations for existing quotas and other restrictions keyed to 
“traditional technologies,” saving its sterner demands for the digital technologies 
of the future.  And second, the relative ability of these negotiating parties to 
withstand American demands for liberalization of trade in cultural products 
“reflect quite accurately the negotiating capacity of the States involved” – 
meaning that “as usual, the least able to protect themselves … end up paying the 
higher price.”103 Australia, “the only developed country among the States 
involved in the recent trade agreements,” insisted upon “the most elaborate and 
complex of all lists of reservations in the audiovisual sector,” among other things 
preserving existing quotas for commercial television and commercial radio.  
“The only thing that was lost in that regard was the capacity to adopt higher 
quotas or more restrictive measures.”104 Likewise Singapore and Chile managed 
to include relatively significant reservations, as did Costa Rica and the 
Dominican Republic, parties to the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA), and Morocco.105 At the other end of the spectrum, however, the least 
affluent participants in the CAFTA negotiations – Guatemala, Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Nicaragua – evidently “all opted to leave their audiovisual sector 
wide open to imports.”106 Indeed, it is interesting to note that Bernier’s 
conclusions regarding the relative ability of these countries to withstand U.S. 
 
103 Id. at 15. 
104 Id. at 13.  The United States and Australia, of course, each presented the agreement as a victory 
to their constituents.  Whereas the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative claimed that in 
“broadcasting and audiovisual services, the FTA contains important and unprecedented 
provisions to improve market access for U.S. films and television programs over a variety of 
media including cable, satellite, and the Internet,” emphasizing the new technologies, Australia’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade focused rather on the maintenance of “existing local 
content requirements” as well as “Australia’s right to intervene in response to new media 
developments, subject to a number of commitments on the degree or level of any new or 
additional local content requirements.” See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, U.S. and Australia Complete Free Trade Agreement:  Trade Pact With Australia 
Will Expand U.S. Manufacturing Access to Key Pacific Rim Market, Press Release No. 04-08, Feb. 
8, 2004; Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia-United States 
Free Trade Agreement: the outcome on local content requirements in the audiovisual sector, available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/backgrounder/audiovisual.html (accessed Sept. 
6, 2006); see also Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia-
United States Free Trade Agreement:  Key Outcomes, available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/outcomes/02_key_outcomes.html (accessed 
Sept. 6, 2006). 
105 Bernier, supra note 102, at 10-15. 
106 Id. at 11-12.   
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demands for liberalization of cultural products map well onto per capita gross 
domestic product for each of these countries.107
In any event, the bilateral setting would appear to offer the United States 
enormous benefits in terms of the capacity to establish useful precedents for 
future negotiations in other fora.108 It is considerably easier for the United States 
to get what it wants in bilateral negotiations than it is multilateral negotiations, 
and Bernier’s analysis clearly bears this out in the context of recent bilateral 
negotiations including commitments on cultural products.  At the same time, 
however, commitments undertaken by countries that ratify UNESCO’s Culture 
Convention would seem – at least in theory – to problematize U.S. trade 
strategies in the bilateral context just as much as in the multilateral context.  
Again, the Culture Convention requires that “when entering into other 
international obligations, Parties shall take into account the relevant provisions 
of this Convention”109 – a commitment that would apply in bilateral and regional 
fora just as it would at the multilateral level.  Less affluent countries negotiating 
one-on-one with the United States will undoubtedly remain subject to greater 
pressure to liberalize trade in cultural products, as in other areas,110 but the 
Culture Convention could nevertheless present a real legal and diplomatic 
hurdle to the attainment of the United States’ trade agenda if bilateral 
negotiating parties can point to existing international legal obligations toward 
the preservation of cultural diversity. 
IV. UNESCO and Cultural Diversity 
UNESCO, like the GATT, was born of a post-war desire to secure the peace 
by facilitating international connections and modes of exchange.  Just as the 
architects of the GATT believed that the extreme protectionism of the 1930s had 
contributed to the outbreak of war, and that free trade constituted an essential 
 
107 According to the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database, the 
purchasing-power-parity per capita gross domestic product of each of these countries (in current 
international dollars) for 2006 is estimated to be: Australia, $32,127.483; Singapore, $29, 742.848; 
Chile, $12,737.111; Costa Rica, $10,747.292; Dominican Republic, $8,018.117; Morocco, $4,818.552; 
El Salvador, $4,619.982; Guatemala, $4,265.803; Nicaragua, $3,769.531; and Honduras, $3,130.951.  
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/index.aspx (accessed Sept. 15, 2006). 
108 For an exploration of such negotiating tactics in the FTAA negotiations, see Bruner, supra note 
75, at 38-52. 
109 Culture Convention, supra note 27, art. 20:1(b). 
110 See, e.g., International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), UNESCO 
Overwhelmingly Approves Cultural Diversity Treaty, 9 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Oct. 26, 
2005, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-10-26/story4.htm (accessed Sept. 7, 2006). 
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step in achieving economic recovery, stability, and security,111 so UNESCO’s 
founders stated in the organization’s 1945 constitution that “ignorance of each 
other’s ways and lives has been a common cause … of that suspicion and 
mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have 
all too often broken into war,” and that “the peace must therefore be founded, if 
it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.”112 
The primary purpose of UNESCO, then, is “to contribute to peace and 
security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, 
science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of 
law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed … 
by the Charter of the United Nations.”113 Crucial questions, of course, include 
how UNESCO best achieves this, and what specific goals the organization can 
pursue consistent with this expressed purpose.  UNESCO’s constitution 
identifies certain means of “realiz[ing] this purpose,” including recommending 
“such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of 
ideas by word and image”114 – language well suited to the United States’ 
liberalizing agenda in today’s trade and culture debate.115 At the same time, 
however, UNESCO’s constitution does recognize and endorse the preservation of 
“the independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures and education 
systems of the States Members of the Organization.”116 Although this language 
technically goes to what the organization will refrain from doing (i.e. interfering 
in domestic policy), there is broader language that further legitimates UNESCO’s 
actions in the area of cultural diversity – notably, its mandates to “[c]ollaborate in 
 
111 WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero, From Vision to Reality:  The Multilateral Trading System 
at Fifty, Address to the Brookings Institution Forum “The Global Trading System:  A GATT 50th 
Anniversary Forum,” Mar. 4, 1998, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprr_e/wash_e.htm (accessed Sept. 16, 2006). 
112 Constitution of UNESCO, Preamble, Nov. 16, 1945, available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=6206&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed Sept. 15, 2006). 
113 Id., art. I:1. 
114 Id., art. I:2(a). 
115 See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 47, Statement to 33rd UNESCO General Conference, Explanation of 
Vote of the United States on the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions (U.S. Ambassador Louise Oliver citing this language in explaining the 
United States’ no vote on the Culture Convention).  Incidentally, the United States has also 
emphasized its role in the founding of UNESCO, including the drafting of the preamble to 
UNESCO’s constitution by American author Archibald MacLeish.  See U.S. Department of State, 
About U.S. and UNESCO, available at http://www.state.gov/p/io/unesco/usunesco/ (accessed Sept. 
15, 2006). 
116 Constitution of UNESCO, supra note 112, art. I:3. 
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the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples”; to 
further conservation of “books, works of art and monuments of history and 
science”; and to facilitate “methods of international cooperation calculated to 
give the people of all countries access to the printed and published materials 
produced by any of them.”117 Though none of this speaks directly to cultural 
protectionist policies of the type later embraced in an era of globalization – 
unsurprising, given the recent history of extreme isolationism and global war 
preceding UNESCO’s creation in 1945 – these broadly worded mandates do 
suggest that the organization’s founders envisioned it pursuing various courses 
of action to further mutual understanding among the peoples and cultures of the 
world.  The Culture Convention, which aims to legitimate the use of domestic 
policies not to keep foreign words and images out, but to preserve the means of 
local cultural production – expected to redound to the benefit of other cultures as 
well118 – would appear in harmony with UNESCO’s broad purpose. 
A. Culture as Organism 
UNESCO has facilitated the adoption of a number of instruments relating to 
cultural preservation,119 which have increasingly conceptualized cultural 
diversity as a form of public good.  Notably, in the Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity (UDCD) adopted in 2001, cultural diversity, “embodied in the 
uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the groups and societies making up 
humankind,” is described as being “as necessary for humankind as biodiversity 
is for nature.”  Cultural diversity is likened to genetic diversity; it is “a source of 
exchange, innovation and creativity.”120 
Elsewhere UNESCO has built on this conception, stating that “‘cultural 
ecosystems’ made up of a rich and complex mosaic of cultures, more or less 
powerful, need diversity to preserve and pass on their valuable heritage to future 
generations.”121 Having taken the position that the very diversity of cultures is 
itself a good, the UDCD continues that while “ensuring the free flow of ideas by 
 
117 Id., art. I:2. 
118 The Culture Convention, in its Preamble, expresses the view that “cultural diversity forms a 
common heritage of humanity and should be cherished and preserved for the benefit of all,” 
while also stating that “cultural diversity is strengthened by the free flow of ideas, and that it is 
nurtured by constant exchanges and interaction between cultures.”  Culture Convention, supra 
note 27, Preamble. 
119 See, e.g., Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore, Nov. 15, 
1989; Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity [hereinafter UDCD], Nov. 2, 2001; Charter on 
the Preservation of Digital Heritage, Oct. 15, 2003; Convention for the Safeguarding of the 
Intangible Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17, 2003; see also Brooks, supra note 9, at 114-20. 
120 UDCD, supra note 119, art. 1. 
121 UNESCO, Culture, trade and globalisation:  Questions and Answers, supra note 49, no. 18. 
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word and image” is obviously important, “care should be exercised that all 
cultures can express themselves and make themselves known.”122 If the aim to 
limit the perceived homogenizing influence of free trade were not already clear 
enough, the UDCD adds that “cultural goods and services … as vectors of 
identity, values and meaning, must not be treated as mere commodities or 
consumer goods.”123 Because “[m]arket forces alone cannot guarantee the 
preservation and promotion of cultural diversity,” each country must, “with due 
regard to its international obligations, … define its cultural policy and … 
implement it through the means it considers fit.”124 
That this should not come at the expense of individual rights of free speech 
and expression – including the right to receive information of one’s choosing – is 
reflected in the uneasy use of qualifiers (“While ensuring the free flow of ideas 
by word and image ….”; “While ensuring the free circulation of ideas and works 
….”).125 But at the same time, the document refers explicitly to guarantees of 
“cultural rights” – that is, the right to participate in the cultural life of one’s 
community – appearing in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.126 
Perhaps most significantly, however, the UDCD asserts that “the pre-
eminence of public policy … must be reaffirmed,”127 suggesting that in the view 
of those standing behind this document, the political prerogative had been 
displaced by liberal economics.  The attached action plan, then, places at the top 
of the list “consideration of the advisability of an international legal instrument 
on cultural diversity,”128 a step presumably aimed at bolstering the reassertion of 
domestic policy autonomy in an area increasingly dominated by free trade 
obligations.  
B. The United States’ Love-Hate Relationship with UNESCO 
Notwithstanding its involvement in the organization’s founding, the United 
States actually parted ways with UNESCO for about twenty years starting in 
1984, a move described by the State Department as reflecting “a growing 
 
122 UDCD, supra note 119, art. 6. 
123 Id., art. 8. 
124 Id., arts. 9, 11. 
125 Id., arts. 6, 9. 
126 Id., art. 5.  See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27, Dec. 10, 1948, available at 
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (accessed Sept. 16, 2006); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter ICESCR], arts. 13, 15, Jan. 3, 1976, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm (accessed Aug. 30, 2006). 
127 UDCD, supra note 119, art. 11. 
128 Id., Action Plan ¶ 1. 
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disparity between U.S. foreign policy and UNESCO goals.”129 More specifically, 
the rift reflected diverging views on the propriety of “free-market dominance of 
the world communications order” between the United States and developing 
countries.130 A 1980 UNESCO-sponsored report by a commission led by Irish 
diplomat Sean MacBride recommended, among other things, that public funding 
be made available for “non-commercial forms of mass communication” as a 
means of improving the communications order.  Although the report specifically 
rejected government censorship and affirmed as basic human rights the ability to 
speak and receive information freely, the report was nevertheless tarred by the 
U.S. government and the American Bar Association as an assault on First 
Amendment principles.  C. Edwin Baker speculates that “the U.S. response to 
[the report] was totally captured by an intersection of corporate interests and 
Cold War fears,” observing that the U.S. position “seemed to equate corporate 
interests – free trade and commercial dominance – with the meaning of the First 
Amendment and international human rights,” notwithstanding U.S. courts’ 
general rejection of arguments that the First Amendment should be interpreted 
to shield commercial media from labor, antitrust, and structural regulations.131 
The United States returned to UNESCO in 2003, President George W. Bush 
explaining that the organization “has been reformed.”132 In light of the Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity adopted in 2001, however, including what U.S. 
officials must have considered an ominous gesture toward a potential treaty to 
be negotiated in a forum in which the United States had no formal input, one 
might reasonably question whether the real impetus for the return to UNESCO 
was precisely that it had not “reformed,” and in fact seemed to be moving more 
decidedly in what U.S. officials considered the wrong direction.  An unnamed 
“U.S. official” speaking to a journalist in the wake of the Culture Convention’s 
adoption reportedly “insisted that the United States did not rejoin specifically to 
address the cultural diversity treaty,”133 but in any event, as described below, 
opposition to the Culture Convention – or at least the attempt to defang it – 
would become a major preoccupation for U.S. representatives upon rejoining 
UNESCO. 
 
129 U.S. Department of State, About U.S. and UNESCO, supra note 115. 
130 Baker, supra note 53, at 218. 
131 Id. at 271-73 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
132 U.S. Department of State, About U.S. and UNESCO, supra note 115. 
133 William New, U.N. Group Oks Diversity Treaty Over U.S. Objections, TECH. DAILY, Oct. 17, 2005, 
available at Lexis (paraphrasing an unnamed “U.S. official”). 
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V. The Culture Convention 
Although the explicit drive toward a treaty on cultural diversity most clearly 
emerged within UNESCO in the 2001 Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity, countries that felt particularly vulnerable to U.S. media domination 
had for years actively advocated such an international instrument.  Chief among 
them were Canada and France134 – developed nations and allies with whom the 
United States had long maintained significant trade and cultural ties. 
A. Canada 
Canada’s concerns regarding U.S. media dominance are long-standing, the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation itself having been created in the early 20th 
Century amidst fears that “U.S. radio programming would dominate Canadian 
airwaves.”135 Today, the principal governmental body responsible for cultural 
policy is the Department of Canadian Heritage, and the broad range of domestic 
legal structures aimed at the preservation of Canadian culture includes content 
regulations, ownership restrictions, language policies, subsidies, and tax 
measures.136 Content regulation involves a system of quotas requiring that 
specified amounts of “Canadian content” be broadcast through a given medium, 
and whether a given musical performance or television program qualifies as 
“Canadian” for these purposes turns generally on whether a critical mass of 
creative decision making was performed by Canadians.137 In essence this system 
permits the employment of “Canadianness” as a regulatory concept without 
directly involving the government in specifying the concept’s content.138 For 
example, radio stations are required to “ensure that 35% of their popular musical 
selections are Canadian each week” (in addition to other restrictions, notably that 
French-language stations “ensure that at least 65% of the popular vocal music 
selections … are in the French language”), and private television stations, 
networks and “ethnic TV” are generally required, over the course of each year, to 
ensure that 60 percent of daytime programming (6:00 a.m. to midnight) and 50 
 
134 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 9, at 120 (observing that Canada and France were “the driving 
forces behind” the Culture Convention). 
135 Media Awareness Network, Media and Canadian Cultural Policies Chronology, supra note 70. 
136 See generally Media Awareness Network, Canada’s Cultural Policies, supra note 70. 
137 See generally Media Awareness Network, Canadian Content Rules (Cancon), supra note 70. 
138 See OWEN-VANDERSLUIS, supra note 54, at 130.  Owen-Vandersluis points out that “Canadian” 
content requirements exclude residents lacking formal citizenship, as well as “cultural outsiders” 
desiring to participate in domestic Canadian debates, and argues that requiring “original” 
content – that is, content “produced for the Canadian market” – would offer a superior 
regulatory approach more consistent with cultural diversity concerns.  Id. at 148-49. 
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percent of evening programming (6:00 p.m. to midnight) be Canadian content.139 
Whether music is sufficiently Canadian is assessed according to the “MAPL” 
system (generally requiring that at least two of the “music,” “artist,” 
“production” and “lyrics” be Canadian or the work of Canadians), and television 
programs can be certified as Canadian if the key producer and “creative 
personnel” are Canadians and “75% of service costs and post-production lab 
costs are paid to Canadians.”140 
Canada has likewise sought to protect its capacity to enact and enforce such 
cultural policies, as discussed above, by insisting that various trade agreements 
include special provisions governing cultural products or exempting them 
altogether.141 The importance of cultural policy to Canadians is reflected in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a component of the Constitution of 
Canada, which affirms “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, 
including freedom of the press and other media of communication,” while 
providing that the Charter “be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”142 
A 1999 report produced by the Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group 
on International Trade (SAGIT), a group advising Canada’s Department of 
Cultural Heritage and its Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
makes clear that the thrust of Canada’s cultural policy is directed at a discrete 
range of popular media.  “Canadian books, magazines, songs, films, new media, 
radio and television programs reflect who we are as a people.”  Globalized and 
increasingly liberal markets, however, had made it “more challenging to 
negotiate trade agreements that recognize cultural diversity and the unique 
nature of cultural products.”  SAGIT identified and considered four possible 
responses to this dilemma.  Canada could (1) push for a “broadly-worded 
cultural industries exemption” in new trade agreements; (2) make sectoral 
reservations for cultural industries; (3) “initiate a new international instrument, 
which would lay out the ground rules for cultural policies and trade”; or (4) 
negotiate industry-specific agreements regarding cultural policies and trade. 
 
139 See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Canadian Content for 
Radio and Television, modified Apr. 2, 2004, available at 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/INFO_SHT/G11.htm (accessed Sept. 21, 2006). 
140 See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, The MAPL System, 
modified May 31, 2001, available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/INFO_SHT/R1.htm (accessed Sept. 
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141 See supra part III.B. 
142 CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS arts. 2(b), 27, available at 
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SAGIT concluded that the best option would be “a new international instrument 
on cultural diversity,” which among other things would permit countries to 
implement and maintain domestic legal structures promoting “cultural and 
linguistic diversity,” and clarify which types of measures would be permitted 
without raising the specter of retaliatory trade measures.143 
In its report, SAGIT observed that “cultural industries not only help us 
exchange ideas and experiences, they make a significant contribution to our 
economy.”144 The economic contribution of cultural production, however, has a 
double-edged cultural effect, as Canada has sought not only to spur domestic 
cultural production and bolster the competitiveness of Canadian cultural 
producers, but also to lure lucrative Hollywood production across the border.  
Ironically, while the purpose of the former is to maintain cultural distance from 
the United States, the practicality of the latter depends critically on Canada’s 
cultural and geographic proximity to the United States.145 Ultimately the impacts 
are difficult to ascertain, though scholars examining the effects of a tax incentive 
scheme aimed at attracting film producers to Manitoba found that in subsequent 
years foreign production activities increased substantially while Canadian 
production activities in the province actually declined.146 
Much like the view that would be reflected in the Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity (2001),147 SAGIT’s 1999 report characterizes local cultural 
production as a sort of public good, observing that the “Canadian government 
invests in promoting culture, just as it invests in other activities that benefit its 
citizens, such as protecting the public health, protecting the environment and 
maintaining a defense force.”148 Many have observed that media products 
themselves exhibit the two principle characteristics of “public goods” in the 
economic sense:  (1) non-exclusive use, meaning that once the media product is 
created, the use of the product by one person does not impinge on its use by 
another person (which in turn suggests that the cost of providing it to each 
additional person will be less than the average cost of providing it to all); and (2) 
non-excludability, meaning that those who do not help defray its cost can get the 
same benefit as those who do.149 As the SAGIT report implies, however, the 
benefits that a society derives from maintaining its own cultural production 
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capacities – “a better understanding among people in Canada,” “a healthy 
multicultural society,” “a sense of community”150 – is also, in a broader sense, a 
sort of public good that, in the SAGIT’s view, only government policy can 
facilitate with concerted effort.  Just as the very same government policymakers 
who might want a vibrant Canadian audiovisual industry might nevertheless 
find it hard to turn down the economic benefit that comes from actually 
facilitating Hollywood production in Canada, so individual consumers who 
might, if asked, favor policies buffering domestic cultural producers might 
themselves, as consumers, choose rather to buy (or watch or listen to) American 
cultural production.151 SAGIT’s 1999 report is not entirely clear as to precisely 
why the group favored a new international instrument over the culture exception 
approach, though these internal tensions may offer a partial explanation.  An 
instrument hashing out once and for all the scope of acceptable deviations from 
trade disciplines in the area of cultural production – or at least broadly 
legitimizing such deviations – would remove the temptation to give too much in 
trade negotiations, a temptation that could be expected to recur and proliferate 
over time if left unchecked.   
At the same time, however, SAGIT’s preference for a new international 
instrument presumably also reflects its perception that culture exceptions 
embedded in trade agreements could not be relied upon to provide sufficient 
protection – a conclusion reinforced by actual trade disputes between Canada 
and the United States.152 For example, Canada had long banned the importation 
of so-called “split-run” periodicals – essentially editions of foreign periodicals 
with advertisements directed at a Canadian audience.153 The American 
publishers of Sports Illustrated, however, in 1993, struck on an end-run around 
this ban by electronically transmitting the Canadian edition to Canadian facilities 
for printing.  In response, Canada imposed an 80 percent excise tax on the value 
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of advertisements in such split-run magazines.154 The United States decided to 
challenge the legitimacy of this excise tax, but rather than doing so through 
NAFTA, which included the culture exception from the prior bilateral 
agreement, opted to do so under the WTO framework.155 At the WTO, Canada’s 
primary argument was that advertising is a service falling within the GATS, 
under which Canada had made no commitments relating to advertising.156 
Ultimately, however, the WTO’s Appellate Body rejected this argument, 
observing in its June 1997 report, among other things, that the tax was actually 
imposed on the periodical itself, not the advertising directly, and that “a 
periodical is a good comprised of two components:  editorial content and 
advertising content” – though both could “be viewed as having services 
attributes.”157 The more onerous disciplines of the GATT therefore applied, and 
the excise tax was found to have violated Canada’s obligations under GATT 
Article III:2 (national treatment).158 Canada set about repealing the tax and 
making other domestic legal changes required to comply with the decision,159 as 
U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky crowed that the decision 
affirmed that “WTO rules prevent governments from using ‘culture’ as a 
pretense for discriminating against imports.”160 The episode could only have left 
Canadian observers wondering where the “culture exception” that was 
supposed to have saved them from American media inundation had gone.161 
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In any event, the Canadian government was broadly in agreement with the 
conclusions of SAGIT’s 1999 report, though it endeavored to finesse the obvious 
protectionist aim of such an undertaking.  As the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade would put it, “[t]he Government agrees that Canada 
should pursue a new international instrument on cultural diversity,” 
characterizing SAGIT’s aim in somewhat muted terms as being “to enable 
Canada and other countries to maintain policies that promote their culture while 
respecting the rules of the international trading system and ensuring markets for 
cultural exports.”162 
By 2002, however, Canada had made clear that it would not negotiate further 
audiovisual liberalization under GATS until a multilateral instrument 
safeguarding domestic cultural policies was in place,163 and SAGIT had produced 
a “model” instrument to do just that.  Characterizing its 1999 report has having 
“concluded that there was a need for a new international rules-based approach 
to managing the interface between cultural policy objectives and trade 
obligations,” and observing among other things the adoption in the meantime of 
the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity by UNESCO’s General 
Conference in 2001, SAGIT describes the model agreement as recognizing “the 
need to ensure that the international trading system is compatible with the goal 
of preserving and enhancing cultural diversity.”  SAGIT registered alarm and 
dissatisfaction that “there are WTO members who wish to see further services 
liberalization in a sector with large cultural implications” (i.e. audiovisual 
services) and that in the FTAA negotiations “the issue of how to treat cultural 
industries and domestic cultural policies will arise.”164 The model agreement 
itself extended broad latitude “to take measures with respect to the creation, 
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production, distribution and exhibition of cultural content,”165 with an 
“illustrative list of measures that may be taken” provided in an Annex,166 and 
provided for a relatively robust dispute resolution body.167 Pointedly, explicit 
exceptions subordinating the draft agreement to “legal guarantees of freedom of 
expression” and “international treaties respecting the protection of intellectual 
property” were included, but no such exception for a party’s trade obligations 
appears in the model agreement.168
B. France and the European Union 
As in Canada, the European effort toward an international instrument on 
cultural diversity – spearheaded by France – has been explicitly linked with 
cabining trade obligations.  As discussed above,169 Article 151 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community enshrines the “unity in diversity” 
principle, establishing the dual pursuit of European and distinct national 
identities within Europe – a principle reinforced in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union.  The Television Without Borders Directive 
represents an attempt to encourage both exposure to other national cultures 
within Europe, as well as the coalescence of a distinctive pan-European culture, 
while buffering both from U.S. media dominance.  Meanwhile the EU has 
refused to make any commitments in the audiovisual sector under the GATS, a 
position adhered to by the European Commission throughout the Doha round of 
negotiations, with the resounding support of the European Parliament. 
The market landscape and cultural concerns that prompted the Television 
Without Frontiers Directive reflect fears of U.S. media domination markedly 
similar to those in Canada.  In the late 1980s, the prevalence of U.S. media 
products on European television screens grew as European networks 
increasingly purchased far less expensive American programs.170 The U.S. 
audiovisual industry “had the good fortune of maturing early,” greatly reducing 
production costs by the 1980s relative to those of European competitors.  Indeed, 
by 1986, it cost about $4 million to produce an hour-long drama in Europe (on 
average), while the cost to produce such a program in the United States was just 
$350,000.  Even worse, that American program could be broadcast by a European 
media company for just $12,000.171 Europe’s solution to this dilemma was the 
 
165 Id., art. VI:1. 
166 Id., art. VI:2, Annex 1. 
167 Id., arts. X-XIV. 
168 Id., art. VII:1. 
169 See supra part III.C. 
170 See Middleton, supra note 18, at 610-11. 
171 Id. at 619-20. 
38 
Television Without Frontiers (TWF) Directive, which essentially binds European 
broadcasters’ hands.  Among other things, the TWF directive aims for “the 
protection of European culture through the means of quotas for the broadcasting 
of European works,”172 much like the “Canadian content” requirements 
described above.173 Under the TWF Directive, as amended to date, Member 
States must generally “reserve for European works … a majority proportion of 
their transmission time” and at least 10 percent of transmission time or 10 
percent of their programming budget “for European works created by producers 
who are independent of broadcasters” (in all cases with the major exception of 
“time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising, teletext services and 
teleshopping”).174 The term “European works,” like the term “Canadian 
content,” is defined by reference to creative decisionmaking.175 
For its part, France has gone further than the TWF Directive mandates.  
France has required that broadcasters show 60 percent European works and 40 
percent French works, and – to the consternation of U.S. officials – has applied 
these heightened quotas “to both the 24-hour day and prime time slots,” with 
“the definition of prime time differ[ing] from network to network.”  As the Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative complained in a recent report, the “prime time 
rules are a significant barrier to access of U.S. programs to the French market.”  
This report also took aim at “radio broadcast quotas, which have been in effect 
since 1996 (40 percent of songs on almost all French private and public radio 
stations must be Francophone),” which quotas obviously “limit broadcasts of 
American music.”176 
In a 2003 consultation piece on the GATS negotiations, the European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU) urged the EU to hold out on any GATS commitments 
in the audiovisual sector in order to ensure that an international agreement on 
cultural diversity could be put in place before such negotiations could proceed.  
Noting, among other things, the “cultural, political and social role and 
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importance” of audiovisual services; the production advantage enjoyed by those 
with larger home markets (permitting cost recovery at home and exporting at 
lower prices); the pressures of “progressive liberalization” under GATS Article 
XIX, which would put even limited commitments at risk of expansion in later 
rounds of negotiations; and the absence of any conceptual mechanism for 
distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate cultural protectionist policies under 
existing trade rules,177 the EBU argued that a “Convention on cultural diversity 
could help to clarify the legitimacy of cultural and audiovisual policy measures 
at the national or regional level.”  What was needed, in the EBU’s view, was a 
“‘cultural pillar’, set apart from the existing ‘trade pillar’ – the multilateral WTO 
Agreements” – in order to ensure “more balanced” discussions, as had occurred 
in other areas involving labor, environmental, and other issues.178 
In a 2003 communication to the Council of Europe and the European 
Parliament, the European Commission addressed the issue of an international 
cultural diversity instrument.  Noting the “unity and diversity” principle and 
cultural policies like those in the TWF Directive that it has enabled, the 
Commission stressed that the EU had reserved its ability to pursue cultural 
policies in WTO negotiations.179 With respect to future negotiations, the 
Commission concluded that “a legally binding instrument to preserve and 
promote cultural diversity would be necessary, in order to consolidate certain 
cultural rights,” though it added that “such instrument would not affect and be 
without prejudice to the international legal framework applicable to exchanges of 
cultural goods and services – in particular as regards their trade and intellectual 
property rights aspects.”180 
The European Parliament took this up, expressing a much stronger position 
on the need for such an instrument.  The Parliament stated in a resolution that 
Europe “must continue in [the] future to have the legal right to take all measures 
in the fields of culture and the audiovisual media necessary to uphold and 
promote cultural diversity,” and explicitly characterized the prospect of new 
GATS negotiations as threatening “an ongoing liberalisation,” the result of which 
would be that such protections “would be reviewed and consequently 
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dismantled.”181 Adding that “the principle of cultural diversity is still not 
recognised as a fundamental right under international law,” the Parliament 
stressed the view that cultural products “are not merchandise or consumer goods 
like any other” and should, “in light of their dual nature as economic and 
cultural goods,” be the subject of “special conditions” reflecting that “the market 
cannot be the measure of all things” and “guarantee[ing] in particular diversity 
of opinion and pluralism.”182 In stark contrast with the Commission’s more 
deferential view, the Parliament called for outright exemption of cultural 
products from any liberalization under the WTO agreements, and likewise called 
upon the EU “to engage in multilateral talks within the forthcoming negotiations 
on a Convention on cultural diversity in UNESCO.”183 Like the EBU, the 
Parliament took the view that GATS negotiations should be put on hold, and 
“stresse[d] that protection of support instruments, and thus of cultural diversity, 
cannot be achieved in the context of the WTO and GATS, but can only be 
promoted by negotiating a Convention within the framework of UNESCO.”  The 
Parliament even went so far as to call on “the UNESCO General Conference to 
insist that the Member States do not undertake commitments in other 
international fora or bilateral agreements which would run counter to the 
protection and promotion of cultural diversity.”184 The European Parliament’s 
view on the necessity of a culture convention to the preservation of cultural 
sovereignty, and the perception that the clearest threat against which Europe 
required such protection lay in potential GATS audiovisual negotiations, could 
not have been made more clear. 
C. Drafting and Negotiations 
The effort toward a culture convention within UNESCO began with the 
appointment by the Director-General of a “multidisciplinary international group 
of 15 independent experts” in various areas thought pertinent to the task 
(anthropology, international law, economics of culture, and philosophy), who 
were charged with making recommendations on the overall structure and 
drafting of the convention.185 In defining the scope of the convention, this 
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committee determined that “precise, but not fixed, definitions” should be 
employed to reflect “the very broad and constantly evolving field that is the 
subject of the convention.”  Hence terms like “culture” and “cultural diversity” 
would not be used “in the full range of their acceptations and manifestations, but 
only in relation to the term ‘cultural expressions’ … transmitted by means of 
‘cultural goods and services’, having due regard for the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.”186 With respect to how the contemplated instrument would 
relate to other international legal instruments, the committee considered two 
possibilities.  Either it would have no effect on other international legal 
obligations, or it “could affect them wherever exercise of those rights or 
compliance with those obligations might give rise to serious damage to the 
diversity of cultural expressions or might threaten such diversity, except in the 
case of international instruments concerning intellectual property rights.”187 Put 
differently, it would appear that in the committee’s view, the convention should 
in no way affect intellectual property-related rights and obligations, and the only 
real question was whether trade-related rights and obligations should be 
affected.  The July 2004 preliminary draft of the convention prepared by this 
committee accordingly offered two options for a provision on the convention’s 
relationship to other instruments.  Either (1) the provision would state that 
“[n]othing in this Convention shall affect the rights and obligations of the States 
Parties under any other existing international instruments,” or (2) it would state 
that it did not affect existing intellectual property rights and obligations, but that 
existing rights and obligations would be affected – in an unspecified manner – 
“where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause serious damage 
or threat to the diversity of cultural expressions.”188 
Other international bodies were to weigh in on the coalescing culture 
convention, and generally they registered concern regarding potential incursions 
on the turf of the trade regime.  Another UN body, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), observed that “the fact that 
the draft seems to try to devise ways for countries to maintain policies that 
promote cultural diversity in spite of existing trade and other agreements give 
the impression that WTO agreements currently do not allow governments to 
maintain such policies.”  UNCTAD worried that this could actually hurt 
developing countries’ ability to negotiate for greater developed market access 
through the WTO.  Though sympathetic with the goal of preserving cultural 
diversity, UNCTAD felt that “from the trade and development point of view, 
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protectionism should not be encouraged in the name of culture.”  UNCTAD also 
expressed concern about the breadth of the definitions employed, which 
appeared to “leave[] the scope and coverage of the convention completely 
open.”189 UNCTAD argued that GATS was sufficiently flexible to permit 
protection of cultural diversity, and observed that Article 13 of the draft, which 
“provide[d] that parties shall bear in mind the objectives of this convention when 
making any international commitments,” might be read “to refer to specific 
commitments made under the trade negotiations including the GATS.”  
UNCTAD felt that this should be clarified, and that the provision on the 
convention’s relationship to other international instruments should be 
eliminated, given that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties already sets 
out principles governing the interpretation of treaties, over which the draft 
convention offered no improvement.190 
The WTO, for its part, summarized the views expressed by its members 
during an “informal discussion” of the draft UNESCO convention.  The WTO 
reported that “a majority of the delegations that took the floor expressed 
concerns of varying degrees,” notably “the potential for conflict or 
inconsistencies with WTO obligations and ongoing negotiations in various 
areas.”  Among other things, “[m]any” delegations “considered that the 
proposed definitions …, in particular that of cultural goods and services, were 
overly broad and imprecise,” giving rise to “potential to intersect with various 
aspects of WTO Agreements.”  Given the “lack of precision,” apparently “almost 
anything could be said to be a cultural good or service.”  The cultural policies 
legitimized by the draft convention, it was feared, “could be used to justify 
actions inconsistent with WTO obligations and invite protectionist abuse.”  The 
requirement that signatories take the convention into account when entering 
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other agreements left some WTO delegations “fear[ing] that such a provision 
might negatively affect WTO negotiations by inciting Members not to make 
offers in certain areas out of concern that these might conflict with the objectives 
of the UNESCO Convention.”  As to the provision on the convention’s 
relationship with other treaties, with its two options, the “majority of 
delegations” preferred the option subordinating the convention to all existing 
international rights and obligations, while “a few” preferred the other option out 
of concern for the protection of cultural diversity.  One delegation took the view 
that neither was necessary in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.191 
In late 2004 the drafting moved into a second stage in which government 
representatives took over from the committee of experts.192 At a meeting in 
September “all those who spoke agreed that [the preliminary draft] could be 
taken as a sound basis for their work,” though the “definition of ‘cultural goods 
and services’, and the very use of such terminology (sometimes regarded as too 
commercial), were the subject of debate.”  The provision on the convention’s 
relationship to other instruments also “provoked considerable comment.”193 By 
December the document had swelled to 130 pages as countries contributed 
different options for various provisions.194 As the negotiations continued, it 
apparently emerged that a number of delegations preferred to use neither variant 
regarding the relationship to other instruments, opting rather to “look at some 
third way … establish[ing] that there was to be no precedence among 
international instruments and … ensuring that they were complementary.”195 
The European Parliament, meanwhile, looking into the negotiations from the 
outside, expressed the view that the convention’s relation to trade disciplines 
was “a key aspect” that should “be approached in such a way that the protection 
of cultural diversity is given at least the same priority as other policies, and on no 
account a lesser priority.”  The Parliament also advocated a binding dispute 
 
191 IGO Comments, supra note 189, at 23-26. 
192 Preliminary Report By the Director-General Setting Out the Situation to be Regulated and the 
Possible Scope of the Regulating Action Proposed, Accompanied By the Preliminary Draft of a 
Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions 
[hereinafter Director-General Report], 33 C/23, Aug. 4, 2005, at 5. 
193 Id. at 5-6. 
194 Id. at 7. 
195 Id. at 10. 
44 
resolution mechanism to develop an international “case-law relating to cultural 
diversity.”196
By June 2005 a revised draft had been prepared,197 and by all indication it was 
the product of heated negotiations.  The United States found little to like in the 
document, raising formal objections relating to a number of provisions including: 
• Preamble paragraph 18, stating that “cultural activities, goods and 
services have both an economic and a cultural nature … and must 
therefore not be treated as solely having commercial value”;  
• Article 1(g), establishing as an objective giving “recognition to the 
distinctive nature of cultural activities, goods and services”; 
• Article 2.4, establishing as a principle “enabling countries … to create 
and strengthen their means of cultural expression, including their 
cultural industries”; 
• Article 4’s definitions of “cultural expressions,” “cultural activities, 
goods and services,” “cultural industries,” “cultural policies,” and 
“protection”; 
• Article 6.2(b)-(c), permitting the adoption of measures that “provide 
opportunities for domestic cultural activities, goods and services … for 
their creation, production, dissemination, distribution and enjoyment” 
(including with respect to language), and those “aimed at providing 
domestic independent cultural industries and activities in the informal 
sector effective access to the means of production, dissemination and 
distribution”; and 
• Article 20, providing that the agreement would not “modify[] rights 
and obligations … under any other treaties,” but that at the same time,  
“without subordinating this Convention to any other treaty,” parties 
would be obliged to “foster mutual supportiveness” with other treaties 
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and to “take into account the relevant provisions of this Convention” 
when interpreting or entering into other treaties.198
In essence, the United States objected to the provisions that would ultimately 
be the heart of the document, and the U.S. proposals for amendments were 
roundly rejected.  Among other things, the United States had sought to include 
language recognizing “the need to take measures that are consistent with other 
international obligations when protecting the diversity of cultural expressions” 
in order to “clarify that nothing in this Convention can be interpreted as allowing 
states to violate international agreements in the fields of trade, human rights, or 
other areas”199 (though of course Article 2.1 already established that the 
convention could not be invoked “to infringe human rights and fundamental 
freedoms,”200 leaving only the trade regime out in the cold).  The United States 
also wanted language to the effect that globalization can enhance cultural 
diversity, not just detract from it.  Ambassador Oliver expressed exasperation at 
the language of Article 20, which the Director-General’s report describes as “a 
compromise solution … found at the end of the session,”201 and which 
Rapporteur Artur Wilczynski characterizes as an “expression of the Plenary’s 
will,” having received the support of “an overwhelming number of delegations” 
(though conceding that this article was indeed “the subject of intense discussions 
for the duration of the negotiation”).202 “In our conversations with delegations 
over the past few weeks,” Oliver wrote a few days before the convention’s 
adoption, “it has been made clear to us that this Article is intended to mean that 
nothing in this Convention can be interpreted as modifying, or prevailing over, 
the rights and obligations of Parties arising under other international 
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agreements.  So why can’t we just say that?”203 The United States had supported 
sending two texts of Article 20 to the General Conference for consideration, but 
this proposal was rejected in favor of the single text described above.204 
Over the months preceding the convention’s adoption on October 20, 2005, 
Ambassador Oliver repeatedly advanced the argument that the document was 
poorly drafted and susceptible to abuse, appealing to the negotiating parties to 
adhere to consensus procedures, but her statements met with a cool response at 
best.  In a speech delivered in September 2005, Ambassador Oliver argued that 
while “some countries feel their cultural expressions are threatened by 
globalization, … throughout history, cultural exchanges across the globe have 
strengthened cultures and nations, not weakened them.”  The issue, ultimately, 
was “the individual’s fundamental right to choose,” and the draft agreement 
appeared susceptible to being “used to restrict cultural exchange and individual 
freedom.”  Oliver also took issue with Canada’s push for a deviation from the 
consensus approach, characterizing it as an attempt “to prevent further 
discussion on the preliminary text.”205 Later, in an intervention on October 17, 
2005, Oliver argued again that “ambiguities in the text might be misused by a 
government as a justification for adopting policies and measures that would 
protect and promote the majority culture within its territory, at the expense of 
minority cultures.”  She also reiterated U.S. concerns regarding “the lack of 
clarity in Article 20,” arguing that “as drafted, any State, in the name of cultural 
diversity, might invoke the ambiguous provisions of this convention to try to 
assert a right to erect trade barriers to goods or services that are deemed to be 
cultural expressions” – a term that had “never been clearly defined and therefore 
is open to wide misinterpretation.”206 
Oliver expressed frustration in the waning moments of the negotiations that 
over “the past four months, we have been told constantly by various states that it 
was too late to negotiate this text – that not a single comma could be changed.”207 
As she would later put it, “the process … disturbed us as much as the substance 
because in this case, the process did not lead to negotiation and it did not lead to 
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U.S. concerns being incorporated within this Convention.”  Noting that “in mid-
April [2005], we were given a completely new text … and we were told to 
negotiate that new text in May,” Oliver complained that over the course of 
subsequent months “every attempt” to reflect U.S. concerns in the document 
“was rebuffed.”208 As one European diplomat said during the week prior to the 
Culture Convention’s adoption, the “US is trying to do everything it can to 
reopen the negotiations when the rest of the world is in favour of the current 
text.”209 Once the writing was on the wall, the United States evidently shifted 
gears, enlisting the likes of Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, as well as U.S. 
ambassadors, to pressure countries not to vote to adopt the convention, an effort 
that proved unsuccessful.210 
D. The Final Text and Reactions 
On October 20, 2005, the UNESCO General Conference adopted the 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions by a vote of 148-2, with the United States and Israel in opposition 
and four countries abstaining from the vote.211 The United States’ efforts to 
amend the document or avert its adoption having failed, the Culture Convention 
would become a binding international instrument among countries ratifying it, 
giving legal effect to everything the United States had found objectionable about 
the draft.  The document affirms that “cultural activities, goods and services have 
both an economic and a cultural nature … and must therefore not be treated as 
solely having commercial value,”212 and includes as an objective “to reaffirm the 
sovereign rights of States to maintain, adopt and implement policies and 
measures that they deem appropriate for the protection and promotion of the 
diversity of cultural expressions on their territory.”213 The Culture Convention 
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requires that the parties “endeavour to create in their territory an environment 
which encourages individuals and social groups … to create, produce, 
disseminate, distribute and have access to their own cultural expressions,” while 
also requiring that they “have access to diverse cultural expressions from within 
their territory as well as from other countries of the world,” and prohibiting the 
instrument’s invocation “in order to infringe human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”214 It further provides for an International Fund for Cultural 
Diversity, to be funded in part by UNESCO,215 as well as an Intergovernmental 
Committee216 and a conciliation mechanism for disputes.217 The Culture 
Convention, by its terms, enters into force three months following the thirtieth 
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession,218 and by December 2006, thirty 
countries had deposited such instruments – Canada having been the first to do so 
(on November 28, 2005).  As a result, the Convention would enter into force on 
March 18, 2007.219 By May 2006 the EU’s Council of Ministers had endorsed the 
Culture Convention,220 and France and Quebec had reportedly “join[ed] forces in 
an attempt to convince countries” to support it.221 
While the United States disliked the very notion of legitimizing cultural 
protectionist measures from the outset, it was clearly most troubled by the 
vagueness and breadth of the Culture Convention’s scope, as well as the 
ambiguity of its relationship with existing international legal regimes – notably 
the trade regime.  The Culture Convention applies, by its terms, to policies and 
measures “related to the protection and promotion of the diversity of culture 
expressions,” which “may include” any or all of a broadly worded – and circular 
– laundry list of policies, which itself includes “regulatory measures aimed at 
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protecting and promoting diversity of cultural expressions.”222 The definitions of 
key terms, then, offer little or no illumination of the contemplated scope.  
“Cultural industries” is defined by reference to “cultural goods or services,” 
which is defined by reference to “cultural expressions,” which is defined by 
reference to “cultural content,” which is defined by reference to things that 
“originate from or express cultural identities.”  The concept of “cultural 
identities” is itself undefined.  Similarly, “cultural policies and measures” is 
defined by reference to “culture.” The concept of “culture” is itself undefined.223 
In essence, United States officials are correct that the theoretical limits of the 
document are unknowable. 
Equally troubling for the United States is the document’s ambiguous 
relationship to other international regimes.  Article 20 retains the structure that 
the United States had found so objectionable in the negotiations, both confirming 
that the Culture Convention would not “modify[] rights and obligations … 
under any other treaties,” and that “without subordinating [it] to any other 
treaty,” the parties are obliged to “foster mutual supportiveness” with other 
treaties and to “take into account the relevant provisions” when applying or 
entering into other treaties.224 Similarly, the parties “undertake to promote the 
objectives and principals of this Convention in other international forums.”225 In 
an apparent endeavor to assert that the Culture Convention could co-exist 
amicably with existing trade regimes in “mutual supportiveness,” the provision 
renders utterly unclear how parties are obligated to address the inevitable 
conflicts with existing trade obligations. 
The Director-General’s report of August 2005 itself reflects a studied 
ambiguity with respect to such concerns.  For example, “[t]hough some experts 
made the point that the notion of ‘cultural goods and services’ evokes the 
vocabulary used in agreements on international trade, the Group felt that the 
proposed definition boiled down to a more cultural conception of this notion.”  
This, evidently, would “allow[] for a distancing from the strictly trade-related 
understanding, while recognizing the dual nature of these goods and services.”226 
This convoluted verbiage, though endeavoring to distinguish the Culture 
Convention from trade concepts, nevertheless tends to confirm that the Culture 
Convention deliberately employs trade terminology with a view to asserting the 
relevance of cultural diversity concerns in that context.  The Director-General’s 
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report likewise declines to illuminate the meaning and proper understanding of 
the article on the Culture Convention’s relationship to other instruments, simply 
characterizing it as “a compromise solution.”  The report concludes by 
mentioning that “[s]everal statements stressed the positive contribution of the 
text to the development of international law, noting that its adoption would be a 
significant step in the history of contemporary international relations in which 
culture is required to play a growing role” – a conclusion from which the United 
States “disassociated itself.”227 
Responses to the Culture Convention in the United States and elsewhere 
differed sharply, but were generally predictable.  As if to confirm U.S. fears, a 
number of accounts in the popular press described the agreement as 
“exempt[ing] certain cultural products from free-trade agreements.”228 A co-
chair of a Canadian organization called the Coalition for Cultural Diversity 
reportedly “said … that it was urgently important to have the UNESCO 
convention in place because of the pressure that countries were facing in trade 
negotiations to give up the right to protect their cultures,”229 and a statement by 
the International Liaison Committee of Coalitions for Cultural Diversity 
highlighted the “principle of non-subordination” in the Culture Convention, 
which it characterized as “meaning the legal status of the convention in 
international law will be equal to that of other international treaties, including 
trade agreements.”230 Likewise the Minister of Canadian Heritage and Minister 
responsible for Status of Women called it “a great day for the cultural 
community” in a statement describing the Culture Convention as being “on an 
equal footing with other international treaties.”231 At least one U.S. official 
claimed that some countries that voted for the Culture Convention would not in 
fact ratify it, including the United Kingdom,232 although the UK’s then-
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presidency of the EU was “winning plaudits for spearheading the European 
campaign” to promote the Culture Convention,233 and UK ambassador Timothy 
Craddock celebrated the “great day for UNESCO,” saying that a “new 
fundamental law on culture, for so long missing from the global governance 
system, has been adopted.”234 
Conservative American columnist George Will, however, took a decidedly 
dimmer view of the Culture Convention, characterizing it as “mischief tinged 
with anti-Americanism” of the sort that had led to America’s withdrawal from 
UNESCO in the 1980s.  Will derided the “pernicious idea” that governments 
could “be trusted to sensibly define and prudently cultivate the proper content of 
culture and artistic expression,” describing its aim as being to “cloak” cultural 
protectionism “in Orwellian language praising what the convention actually 
imperils.”  Reserving choice words for the Culture Convention’s strongest 
proponent in Europe, Will added that France’s “vanity about the glory of its 
culture is not matched by confidence in the power of that culture to thrive unless 
protected.”  Will reads the Culture Convention as “implicitly establish[ing] that 
cultural protectionism is not inhibited by standard free trade agreements,” and 
foresees a slippery slope reaching the likes of “wine, coffee, [and] textiles.”235 
The MPAA likewise had nothing good to say about the Culture Convention, 
Chairman Dan Glickman observing that “the Convention appears to be more 
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about trade and commercial activities than about the promotion of cultural 
diversity.”  The MPAA statement further observes that “many in the U.S. 
business community fear that it is a stalking horse for trade restrictions,” and 
Glickman likewise expressed “concern[] that this Convention could become an 
instrument some governments might employ to undermine commitments made 
in the WTO or in other international agreements.”236 As Glickman would add in 
an interview, “[w]e’re going to have to monitor this closely to make sure this 
doesn’t become a serious problem.”237 
And once again, America’s near isolation was itself a topic of discussion.  The 
United States’ dissent was analogized to its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol on 
climate change and the creation of an International Criminal Court, with the 
anticipation that the United States would again “likely remain a critical and 
perhaps interventionist outsider.”238 A reporter for The Australian noted that 
“[n]ot since the Iraq war has the US been as isolated in a UN forum,” though 
Australia – which had also sided with the United States on the Kyoto Protocol as 
well as many trade issues – was also isolated as one of the four abstaining 
countries.239 Indeed to some it appeared that the United States practically 
relished its isolation in the UN, an apparent stance symbolized by the 
appointment of Ambassador John Bolton, a man with a “history of deep 
skepticism toward international organizations, particularly this one, and a 
demonstrated aversion to commitments that could entangle the United States.”  
Barbara Crossette, in an article (styled a memorandum to Condoleeza Rice) 
published in Foreign Policy, pointed to the United States’ handling of the Culture 
Convention negotiations as a case in point. The “disastrous” approach to the 
negotiations included “vot[ing] against the agency’s budget” in retaliation for the 
United States’ proposed amendments being voted down, a move that 
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particularly angered the Japanese, and left Crossette feeling that the United 
States needed to learn “when to quit debating and cut a deal” at the UN.240
But what would the Culture Convention’s impact actually be – as an 
instrument of law, and otherwise?  Speculations were all over the map in the 
days leading up to and following its adoption.  As mentioned above, some feared 
– and others relished – the notion that it might legally legitimate departures from 
trade regimes.241 As one U.S. diplomat reportedly put it, “[t]his is international 
law…. This is not just a feel-good statement, this is a treaty” saying “that 
governments should be the determinants of what cultural products are available 
in a market.”242 Others, however, tended to doubt that the Culture Convention 
would have much practical impact on a trade panel assessing a dispute 
regarding goods or services already subject to trade disciplines.243 
Observers on both sides of the issue, however, seemed to recognize that 
Article 20 of the Culture Convention, addressing its relationship to other 
international instruments, was perhaps the critical provision of the treaty – and 
that the drafting was a mess.  Observing its apparently contradictory language, 
contemplating both that the Culture Convention would impact the application of 
other treaty regimes while at the same time – somehow – not modifying rights 
and obligations under them, one commentator stated that “Canada and France 
won broad support for the convention partly by blurring the question of its 
impact on trade liberalization or future trade talks.”244 But at the same time, “US 
lobbying is thought to have significantly influenced the evolution of the 
convention, specifically with regard to its explicit link to existing treaties,” 
whereas “France and Canada had initially hoped to secure a wholesale 
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exemption of cultural products from the WTO.”245 What the Director-General’s 
report characterized as a compromise would appear simply to represent the 
glomming together of two incompatible views regarding whether the Culture 
Convention should, or should not, affect existing trade obligations.  In any event, 
“[c]ontradictory statements from different governments about how the treaty 
will affect existing and future trade agreements … suggest that the picture is 
blurred,” though France has emphasized Article 20’s potential to “bolster[] the 
legal case of countries that are resisting pressure in future trade negotiations to 
open their cultural sectors to foreign imports,” suggesting that despite the 
contradictory language on existing international obligations, the Culture 
Convention is really a forward-looking document in the eyes of its major 
proponents.   
VI. Markets and Politics:  The Future of International Trade in Cultural 
Products 
The best interpretation of Article 20 (reproduced below for ease of 
reference246) is that the Culture Convention is primarily about enhancing 
negotiating capacity under the GATS regime for countries desiring to protect 
local cultural producers, and only secondarily (if at all) about affecting the 
application or scope of existing trade obligations.  As previously observed, the 
language in part 1 of the provision stating that it should be interpreted “without 
subordinating this Convention to any other treaty” appears to contradict the 
language in part 2 stating that “[n]othing in this Convention shall be interpreted 
as modifying rights and obligations … under any other treaties to which they are 
parties.”247 By reading narrowly the requirement imposed by part 1 with respect 
to pre-existing international obligations, however, the two parts of the provision 
can be squared with one another.  The specific obligation under part 1 is to “take 
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into account the relevant provisions of this Convention” when “interpreting and 
applying the other treaties,” which might be read to obligate countries that are 
parties both to the Culture Convention and the WTO agreements simply to make 
a good faith effort to behave within the trade regime in a manner consistent with 
obligations under the Culture Convention.  A plain language reading of “take 
into account” would not appear to require more.   
Additionally, this narrow reading of the language of part 1 is reinforced by 
the more straightforward language of part 2, which – as Michael Hahn has 
observed – closely tracks Article 30:2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.  The Vienna Convention provides that “[w]hen a treaty specifies that it 
is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later 
treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.”  Article 20:2 of the Culture 
Convention, then, stating that it does not modify rights or obligations under 
other treaties, effectively constitutes a statement that “it is not to be considered as 
incompatible with” prior treaties within the meaning of Article 30:2 of the Vienna 
Convention, thus resulting in the primacy of pre-existing treaty obligations – 
including those under the WTO agreements.248 The language in part 1 to the 
effect that the Culture Convention is not to be subordinated to other treaties (and 
that “mutual supportiveness” is to be fostered), in this light, may be read as a 
sort of corollary to the first sentence of the article, requiring that all treaties be 
performed in “good faith” (itself a restatement of Article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention), though subject to the more specific language following in parts 1(b) 
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Convention should trump the WTO Agreement as among themselves because this would 
“compromise the WTO Agreement’s object and purpose to provide a comprehensive basis for all 
trade relationships,” and “restrictive trade measures” would “affect potentially all WTO 
members.”  Id. at 544-46.  Hahn does suggest, however, that the WTO would be “ill-advised to 
not try to accommodate” the Culture Convention’s aims, and suggests that either general 
exceptions might be interpreted broadly – or the concept of “like” products might be interpreted 
narrowly – in light of it.  The viability of either mode of interpretation, however, would obviously 
depend critically on the Culture Convention’s ratification rate among WTO members.  See id. at 
546-52; see also Weber, supra note 161, at 12-14, 17-19. 
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and 2.249 If Article 20 can be read in this fashion to require nothing more than 
good faith effort to interpret prior treaties in a manner consistent with the 
Culture Convention’s goals, then there is real reason to doubt that a WTO 
dispute resolution panel would exert itself to locate outcome-determinative rules 
in the Culture Convention250 – particularly when the little relevant WTO case law 
indicates that cultural products will not be treated differently from anything else 
subject to trade disciplines.251
The obligation to take Culture Convention obligations into account “when 
entering into other international obligations,”252 however, is another matter 
entirely.  With respect to future negotiations, there is no conflicting language 
under Article 20 of the Culture Convention because, by hypothesis, there are no 
existing obligations with which to conflict.  Recall that Article XIX of the GATS, 
reflecting the “agreement to disagree” between the United States and others 
(notably France), does require that parties “enter into successive rounds of 
negotiations … with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of 
liberalization.”  The provision includes a limiting principle, however, stating that 
such “process of liberalization shall take place with due respect for national 
policy objectives and the level of development of individual Members, both 
overall and in individual sectors.”253 When a country declines to liberalize a 
sector like audiovisual services, one would anticipate that the United States 
would claim that the country in question had not in fact negotiated in good faith 
“with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization,” as 
Article XIX requires.  With the Culture Convention in place, however, the 148 
nations that voted for its adoption have, in essence, resoundingly endorsed the 
recognition of domestic cultural policies as important “national policy 
objectives” justifying exempting them from this process of liberalization by 
Article XIX’s own terms.   
Of course the efficacy of the Culture Convention in this respect depends 
critically on the circumstances of the country in question – and specifically the 
 
249 See Hahn, supra note 97, at 540; Culture Convention, supra note 27, art. 20; Vienna Convention, 
supra note 190, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”). 
250 Cf., e.g., supra text accompanying note 243. 
251 See Hahn, supra note 97, at 530; see also supra note 161 (observing that the split-run periodicals 
dispute between the United States and Canada effectively represents the totality of WTO case law 
on the treatment of cultural products as such).  It is also worth recalling in this regard that in its 
dispute with the United States over split-run periodicals, the NAFTA culture exception availed 
Canada nothing. See supra text accompanying notes 155-161. 
252 Culture Convention, supra note 27, art. 20:1(b). 
253 GATS, supra note 94, art. XIX:1-2. 
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degree to which they need or desire U.S. market access.254 But even in the case of 
more potent negotiating adversaries like Canada and France, it will depend 
critically on the perceived normative legitimacy of the broader argument for the 
protection of cultural diversity through national protectionist policies.  The 
remaining sections of the paper examine the incentives and goals of Hollywood 
and the U.S. government, the historical development of pertinent trade norms, 
and the relative weakness of human-rights based attacks on the Culture 
Convention, concluding that the burden rests squarely on the United States to 
demonstrate that such liberalization is in fact necessary or desirable.   
A. Hybridity and Choice 
Philosopher and cultural theorist Kwame Anthony Appiah, in a New York 
Times Magazine article published New Years Day 2006, advanced an impassioned 
argument for what he termed a “new cosmopolitanism,” which he contrasted 
with “cultural protectionism.”  Noting the “fear … that the values and images of 
Western mass culture, like some invasive weed, are threatening to choke out the 
world’s native flora,” Appiah paints a picture of naïve cultural “purists” 
endeavoring to defend “some primordial authentic culture” that in fact does not 
exist.255 As evidence of the inevitable hybridity of culture even in the face of 
pervasive American media, he cites the vastly differing perspectives that 
researchers have documented on the global hit television show “Dallas,” 
emphasizing that the show’s meaning takes shape only in the mind of a viewer, 
as refracted through their own attitudes and before the backdrop of local cultural 
conditions.  While the Dutch, for example, found “a reminder that money and 
power don’t protect you from tragedy,” Israeli Arabs found “a program that 
confirmed that women abused by their husbands should return to their fathers.”  
As Appiah points out, “cultural consumers are not dupes.  They can adapt 
products to suit their own needs, and they can decide for themselves what they 
do and do not approve of.”256 What we ought to pursue, concludes Appiah, is a 
“new cosmopolitanism” built on the creative “contamination” of cultures: 
…. I am urging that we should learn about people in other places, 
take an interest in their civilizations, their arguments, their errors, 
their achievements, not because that will bring us to agreement but 
 
254 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 103-107 (discussing such dynamics in the context of bilateral 
negotiations with the United States). 
255 Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Case For Contamination, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 1, 2006, at 30, 32, 
34. 
256 Id. at 34-35. 
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because it will help us get used to one another – something we 
have a powerful need to do in this globalized era.257
No credible policymaker could disagree.  Indeed, Appiah’s conclusion could 
practically have been a paraphrase of the UNESCO constitution, written in 1945, 
which states that “ignorance of each other’s ways and lives has been a common 
cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust 
between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too 
often broken into war.”258 The idea, in both instances, is to ensure contact among 
diverse cultures toward mutual understanding and, ultimately, peace.  And yet 
interestingly, Appiah points to UNESCO’s Culture Convention as expressing the 
“purist” perspective, implicitly comparing it with “visitors from England and the 
United States” who, in his native Ghana, “wince at what they regard as the 
intrusion of modernity on timeless, traditional rituals – more evidence, they 
think, of a pressure in the modern world toward uniformity.”259 Appiah’s 
misconception of the Culture Convention – both its purpose and its likely impact 
– is striking.  Setting aside that scores of developing countries signed onto the 
agreement, and that its major proponents – France and Canada, both developed 
countries – were motivated largely, if not entirely, by their own domestic 
political concerns (though a confluence of interests with the developing world 
was surely welcome), Appiah suggests that this is yet another example of 
Western “purists” seeking to enforce cultural “authenticity” on others – more 
“telling other people what they ought to value in their own traditions.”260 By 
depicting the Culture Convention as a form of censorship, Appiah erects a straw 
man that is easily torn down.  The problem of course, is that this depiction bears 
no resemblance to reality.  Not only does the Culture Convention explicitly 
prohibit its own invocation to justify deviations from established human rights 
principles,261 but its entire purpose is to enhance speech opportunities by 
enabling local production capacity alongside imports from America and 
elsewhere.  Like proponents of liberalized trade in the United States and 
elsewhere, Appiah’s rhetorical move is to characterize the aim as being to 
insulate a static heritage, without acknowledging or engaging with the forward-
looking “discourse” conception of culture that generally animates cultural 
protectionist arguments.262 The hybridized meaning of an American television 
 
257 Id. at 52. 
258 Constitution of UNESCO, Preamble, supra note 112. 
259 Appiah, supra note 255, at 32. 
260 Id. at 34. 
261 See Culture Convention, supra note 27, art. 2:1. 
262 See BAKER, supra note 53, at 250-51; supra part II.B. 
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show like “Dallas” in the minds of, say, Ghanaians, though fascinating, is simply 
irrelevant to the issue at hand, because no one is suggesting that people in Ghana 
or anywhere else should not have access to Western media.263 The Culture 
Convention would legitimate policy measures to facilitate the production of 
alternatives, but they would be just that – alternatives.  Because Appiah does not 
seriously grapple with the nature of markets in cultural products264 – media 
markets in particular – he simply stares past the possibility that the dominance of 
a single set of voices, facilitated by the liberalization of trade in cultural products, 
might ultimately prove to be the greatest barrier to the creative cultural 
“contamination” for which he argues.   
 B. Media Markets and the Hollywood Model 
The centrality of media markets – and film in particular – in the push for a 
Culture Convention naturally gives rise to several questions.  Who, precisely, is 
“Hollywood” anyway?  Is Hollywood “American,” or something else?  What is 
Hollywood’s business model?  Can we rely on this business model, in the hands 
of whoever pursues it, and in a liberalized media market, to bring about the 
fruitful “contamination” that Appiah and (I would argue) the drafters of the 
Culture Convention are after? 
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) is, literally, a group of 
corporations.  According to the MPAA’s website, it is comprised of Paramount, 
Disney Pictures, Sony Pictures, 20th Century Fox, Universal Pictures, and Warner 
 
263 Appiah’s distinction between “purists” and “cosmopolitans” essentially maps onto what one 
anthropologist has called the “diffusionist” camp, viewing “the flow of commodified cultural 
forms from center to periphery as synonymous with cultural homogenization,” and the 
“ecumenist” camp, viewing this as “a cultural interaction that generates and organizes new 
diversities – ‘creolized’ cultural forms.”  See Robert J. Foster, Making National Cultures in the Global 
Ecumene, 20 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 235, 251-52 (1991), available at JSTOR.  Foster also cites 
studies of varying interpretations of “Dallas” in different cultures, arguing that “national cultures 
that sediment out of global cultural interactions are emphatically not self-contained, closed 
realities, isomorphic with delimited territorial spaces.”  Id. at 251.  Again, however, this is 
irrelevant to assessment of the Culture Convention.  While Foster’s points are excellent, the 
Culture Convention simply does not aim to insulate cultures from one another, but to sustain the 
very diversity that underwrites such hybridization. 
264 Appiah makes brief reference to the potential for cheap Western clothing to displace 
traditional dress in a given country, conceding that if people cannot afford to wear what they 
like, it is “a genuine problem,” though he dismisses this concern as one affecting all who are “too 
poor to live the life they want to lead” in any country or culture.  Appiah, supra note 255, at 34.  
He does not, however, engage with media markets – at the core of concerns prompting the 
Culture Convention and the principal sector in which it is expected to have impact – or otherwise 
entertain the notion that government measures on cultural products could be speech enhancing.   
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Brothers.265 These well-known film studios are, in turn, owned and controlled by 
some of the largest and best endowed businesses in the world.  Paramount is 
controlled by Viacom Inc. (Sumner Redstone’s company);266 Disney Pictures is 
controlled by The Walt Disney Company;267 Sony Pictures is controlled by Sony 
Kabushiki Kaisha (Sony Corporation);268 20th Century Fox is controlled by News 
Corporation (Rupert Murdoch’s company);269 Universal Pictures is controlled by 
General Electric Company;270 and Warner Brothers is controlled by Time Warner 
Inc.271 All household names, anyone who has not lived under a rock for the last 
thirty years will immediately recognize the sheer wealth, power, and drive for 
profit that these names represent.272 The combined fiscal year 2005 revenues of 
these six companies totaled over $323.7 billion273 – a figure exceeding the 2005 
gross domestic product of all but 20 nations on Earth.274 
265 See MPAA/MPA web site, available at http://www.mpaa.org (accessed Sept. 29, 2006). 
266 See Viacom Inc., Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 
[hereinafter Viacom 10-K], at I-2; Viacom Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement on Schedule 14A filed 
April 14, 2006, at 13-14. 
267 See The Walt Disney Company, Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended October 
31, 2005 [hereinafter Disney 10-K], at 16.  
268 See Sony Kabushiki Kaisha, Annual Report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended March 31, 
2006 [hereinafter Sony 20-F], at 19. 
269 See News Corporation, Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2006 
[hereinafter News Corporation 10-K], at 2; Definitive Proxy Statement on Schedule 14A filed 
September 7, 2006, at 28. 
270 See General Electric Company, Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2005 [hereinafter General Electric 10-K], at 11. 
271 See Time Warner Inc., Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 
2005 [hereinafter Time Warner 10-K], at 11. 
272 For recent financial reports, see the annual reports cited in notes 266-271. 
273 See Viacom 10-K, supra note 266, at II-2 (reporting revenues of $9,609.6 million); Disney 10-K, 
supra note 267, at 31 (reporting revenues of $31,944 million); Sony 20-F, supra note 268, at 5-6 
(reporting revenues of ¥ 7,475,436 million and a period-end exchange rate of 117.78 yen per U.S. 
dollar, or approximately $63,469.5 million); News Corporation 10-K, supra note 269, at 39 
(reporting revenues of $25,327 million); General Electric 2005 Annual Report to Shareowners for 
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005, at 49, filed as Exhibit 13 to General Electric 10-K, supra 
note 270 (reporting revenues of $149,702 million); Time Warner Inc., Annual Report on Form 10-
K/A (Amendment 1) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 (reporting revenues of $43,652 
million). 
274 World Bank, Total GDP 2005, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf#search=%22%22worl
d%20bank%22%20%22total%20GDP%202005%22%22 (accessed October 1, 2006) (providing gross 
domestic product data by country in U.S. dollars).  Gross domestic product is “the sum of the 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the products.”  World Bank, Data & Statistics:  Technical 
Notes, available at 
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Even this brief survey of the group’s constituents reveals that the Motion 
Picture Association of America is not solely “American,” culturally speaking.  
Sony Corporation is itself a Japanese incorporated and headquartered entity.275 
And News Corporation, though a U.S.-based business,276 is the product of Rupert 
Murdoch’s spectacularly successful career.  Though his greatest business 
successes have occurred in the United States and the United Kingdom, and he 
“even became a US citizen in 1985 to comply with the country’s media 
ownership laws,” Murdoch was born and raised in Australia.277 
Nevertheless, five of the six companies that comprise the MPAA are U.S. 
businesses, and more particularly, four of them are incorporated in the state of 
Delaware,278 long recognized as the predominant jurisdiction for incorporation in 
the United States – particularly among large public companies.279 In light of this, 
it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the fundamental principle guiding 
the exercise of decision-making authority within U.S. corporations.  As students 
of corporate law in the United States quickly learn, “[t]hat director loyalty to the 
‘corporation’ is, ultimately, loyalty to equity investors is an important theme of 
U.S. corporate law.”280 As one famous case put it, it is “not within the lawful 
powers of a board to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the 
merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of 
benefiting others.”281 While other corporate governance systems around the 
 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20437349~me
nuPK:1192694~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (accessed October 1, 
2006).   
275 See Sony 20-F, supra note 268. 
276 See News Corporation 10-K, supra note 269. 
277 Andrew Walker, Rupert Murdoch:  Bigger than Kane, BBC NEWS WORLD ED., July 31, 2002, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2162658.stm (accessed Oct. 2, 2006).  Goodenough, 
writing in 1998, describes more extensive international connections in the past, with “[o]nly 
Warner Brothers and Disney hav[ing] consistently been in unequivocally U.S. hands.”  See 
Goodenough, supra note 8, at 232. 
278 News Corporation, Viacom, and Time Warner are all incorporated in Delaware and 
headquartered in New York, Disney is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Burbank, 
California, and General Electric is incorporated in New York and headquartered in Connecticut.  
Sony is headquartered in Tokyo.  See the annual reports cited in notes 266-271. 
279 The Division of Corporations of the Delaware Department of State reports that over 50 percent 
of U.S. publicly traded companies and 60 percent of the Fortune 500 are incorporated in 
Delaware.  See Division of Corporations, Delaware Department of State, Why Choose Delaware as 
Your Corporate Home?, available at http://www.state.de.us/corp (accessed Oct. 2, 2006). 
280 WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 286 (Aspen, 2003). 
281 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919), quoted in ALLEN & KRAAKMAN,
supra note 280, at 287. 
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world emphasize the interests of other stakeholders to varying degrees (e.g. 
employees, the community), corporate law in the United States has remained 
relatively shareholder-centric.282 In the simplest formulation, then, a corporate 
director’s job – as decision-maker for a U.S. company – is to maximize 
investment return for the benefit of shareholders.283 Indeed, modern state 
statutes do not even require corporations to pretend they have any more 
fundamental objective, or that the “purpose” is to produce a useful or socially 
beneficial product.  The Delaware statute, for example, provides that in 
describing “the business or purposes to be conducted” in the corporate charter, it 
is “sufficient to state … that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any 
lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized.”284 Maximization 
of shareholder wealth (within the bounds of the law, of course) is the embracing 
“purpose” guiding the companies comprising the MPAA.285 
The question facing the MPAA’s constituents, then, is how best to achieve 
this – how best to maximize profit on the sale of media products?  Two 
important elements of the equation turn critically on intellectual property law 
and international trade law.  Disney, for example, in its annual report, observes 
 
282 Whether corporate governance systems will “converge” upon a global set of best practices 
remains an open question, though it is clear that many other jurisdictions have settled upon 
workable systems emphasizing the interests of other stakeholders to varying degrees.  See, e.g.,
generally Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control, 53 STAN. L. REV.
539 (2000); Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate 
Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321 (2001); Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate 
Governance in a Global Environment:  The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
829 (2000).  Others, however, have argued that there is “no longer any serious competitor to the 
view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”  
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439. 
283 This is not, of course, to suggest that Sony has not done perfectly well for its equity owners.  
For Sony’s financials, see Sony 20-F, supra note 268. 
284 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2005), available at Lexis. 
285 Of the six companies, the charters of four of them (Disney, Time Warner, Viacom, and News 
Corporation) state that the company’s purpose is simply to engage in “any lawful act or activity.”  
See Restated Certificate of Incorporation of The Walt Disney Company, art. III, Annex C to the 
Proxy Statement/Prospectus in Form S-4, filed Sept. 30, 1999 (333-88105); Restated Certificate of 
Incorporation of AOL Time Warner Inc., art. III, Exhibit 3.1 to Form 8-K, filed Jan. 11, 2001; 
Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of New Viacom Corp., art. III, Exhibit 3.1 to 
Form Viacom 10-K, supra note 266; Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of News 
Corporation, Inc., art. II, Exhibit 3.1 to Form 8-K, filed Nov. 12, 2004.  Two of the six (General 
Electric and Sony) endeavor to be more specific, but – as one might predict – the forms of activity 
described are extremely broad and far-reaching.  See Certificate of Incorporation of General 
Electric Company, art. 2, Exhibit 3 to Form 8-K, filed May 1, 2000; Articles of Incorporation of 
Sony Corporation, art. 4, Exhibit 1.1 to Sony 20-F, supra note 268. 
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that the “success of our businesses is highly dependent on maintenance of 
intellectual property rights in the entertainment products and services we 
create,” and that the “[i]mposition by foreign countries of trade restrictions or 
motion picture or television content requirements or quotas” poses a competitive 
risk, increasing regulatory costs and “restrict[ing] our ability to offer products 
and services that are profitable.”286 In essence, the MPAA’s constituents desire 
an intellectual property system imbuing their products with the maximum value 
attainable (proportionate to the strength of the rights granted by the legal 
regime), and an international trade system expanding to the maximum scope 
possible the market in which their products can move unfettered. 
The tension between these two positions has not been lost on observers of the 
U.S. entertainment industry.  Canadian scholar Rosemary Coombe, for example, 
has observed the strain between advocating liberalism in the trade regime, while 
at the same time calling for a form of protectionism in the intellectual property 
regime.287 Indeed, for decades intellectual property restrictions were not tied to 
the trade liberalizing program of the GATT system precisely due to the 
“conceptual problem” that intellectual property laws could themselves “be 
categorized as non-tariff barriers to trade.”288 Only in the 1990s, when the GATT 
became subsumed in the WTO system, would the United States “force nations 
that sought favorable trade in other areas to sign the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs), a set of global minimal 
standards for copyright, patent, trade secret, trademark, semiconductor, and 
geographic marker regulations.”289 
The tie between trade liberalism and intellectual property protectionism is 
certainly not their intellectual compatibility; it is simply the advancement of 
corporate interests in the West – and particularly the United States – where 
intellectual property has become increasingly economically important over 
time.290 And as one might expect, the combined lobbying efforts of News 
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Corporation, Viacom, Time Warner, Disney, General Electric, and Sony have 
proven enormously effective in advancing these interests.  Jack Valenti, who 
became President of the MPAA in 1966 and remained in the position for almost 
forty years before leaving in 2004, “established himself as perhaps the most 
prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington” and, during that time, came to 
be the man who Lawrence Lessig would describe as “the nation’s foremost 
extremist when it comes to the nature and scope of ‘creative property.’”291 This 
effort does not, however, mean that Valenti fell down on the job with respect to 
trade advocacy.  During this same period, Valenti came to be recognized as the 
“most formidable trade lobbyist” in the United States,292 describing the MPAA’s 
products as “the jewel in America’s trade crown.”293 As an MPAA “anti-piracy” 
statement put it, “trade agreements … ensure the free flow and protection of 
intellectual property.”294 In terms of maximizing the value of their products and 
expanding the market for them, protectionist intellectual property law and 
liberalist international trade law are of a piece.295 
In the intellectual property context Lessig has strongly criticized the MPAA’s 
pursuit of its “naked self-interest,”296 and his perspective was evidently shared 
by Justice Breyer, who all but said as much in a strongly worded dissent to the 
Supreme Court majority’s 2003 decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft.297 Lessig, who 
argued the case for Eric Eldred challenging the Copyright Term Extension Act 
based on the Constitution’s “limited times” language and the First Amendment, 
would later recall his surprise at the standing-room-only crowd on hand the first 
day, as well as that when he sat down for oral arguments, he “saw Jack Valenti 
sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for family of the Justices.”298 
Ultimately the Court upheld the Act, determining that Congress’ ability to 
extend copyrights was effectively unlimited.299 Breyer, however, desiring more 
exacting scrutiny than the majority had brought to bear, argued in dissent that a 
 
291 LESSIG, supra note 19, at 117-18.  Lessig essentially devotes a chapter of his book Free Culture to 
refuting the claim advanced by Valenti that “[c]reative property owners must be accorded the 
same rights and protections resident in all other property owners in the nation,” notwithstanding 
the constitutional requirement that grants of intellectual property rights be for a “limited time.”  
See id. at 117, 119 (quoting Valenti, internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis removed). 
292 Cable, supra note 19, at 235.  
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statute extending copyrights “involves not pure economic regulation, but 
regulation of expression, and what may count as rational where economic 
regulation is at issue is not necessarily rational where we focus on expression – in 
a Nation constitutionally dedicated to the free dissemination of speech, 
information, learning, and culture.”300 Breyer also pointed to legislative history 
suggesting that the true aim of the law was “the financial assistance the statute 
will bring the entertainment industry, particularly through the promotion of 
exports.”301 “It is easy to understand,” Breyer concluded, “how the statute might 
benefit the private financial interests of corporations or heirs who own existing 
copyrights.  But I cannot find any constitutionally legitimate, copyright-related 
way in which the statute will benefit the public.”302 
The MPAA has not only advocated stronger intellectual property rights, but 
has even opposed changes to the intellectual property registration system that 
would have had no direct impact on their rights over their own intellectual 
property.  The “Eldred Act,” proposed by Lessig in a New York Times op-ed, 
would have freed up unused intellectual property for creative use by others by 
requiring that, 50 years following its creation, the copyright owner pay a nominal 
fee and register the work in order to get the protection of the full copyright term.  
The logic was to eliminate copyright protection “where it is doing nothing except 
blocking access and the spread of knowledge,” while preserving it “for as long as 
Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1” to the copyright 
holder.303 Once the bill was drafted, however, by California’s Zoe Lofgren, the 
“lobbyists began to intervene.”  Notably, “Jack Valenti and the MPAA general 
counsel came to the congresswoman’s office to give the view of the MPAA,” 
communicating “that the MPAA would opposed the Eldred Act,” even though 
they appeared to have no substantive reason for doing so.304 Ultimately, Lessig 
concluded of this effort – quite plausibly – that the “effort to block the Eldred Act 
is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain.  It is 
another step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there will 
be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that there will be no 
commercial use of content that doesn’t require their permission first.”305 
300 Eldred, at 244 (Breyer dissenting). 
301 Id. at 262. 
302 Id., at 266. 
303 LESSIG, supra note 19, at 248-49. 
304 Id., at 253-54 (recounting the MPAA’s rationale for opposing the Eldred Act, including that it 
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This attempt not just “to protect what is theirs,” but also “to assure that all 
there is is what is theirs,”306 highlights another aspect of Hollywood’s business 
model flowing from the fundamental nature of media products.  Such products 
constitute a quintessential example of what Cass Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-
Margalit call “solidarity goods” – that is, products that “have more value to the 
extent that other people are enjoying them; they reflect something like a 
communal impulse.”307 A film, for example, derives at least part of its value to 
any given consumer from “the range of benefits coming from the fact that other 
people are also enjoying or buying it,” including the “social benefits that come 
after the show has been watched.”  Companies in the business “are well aware of 
this fact; they know that the number of viewers and users will increase, 
sometimes exponentially, once popularity is known to exceed a certain 
threshold.”308 Disney, for example, recognizes in its annual report the business 
risks posed by “competition … from alternative providers of the products and 
services we offer and from other forms of entertainment,” as well as that 
Disney’s “success depends substantially on consumer tastes and preferences that 
change in often unpredictable ways.  The success of our businesses depends on 
our ability to consistently create and distribute filmed entertainment” and other 
products “that meet the changing preferences of the broader consumer 
market.”309 To the extent they constitute “solidarity goods,” it is not surprising 
that Hollywood would have a strong incentive to narrow the supply of 
competing intellectual property-based entertainment by opposing initiatives like 
the Eldred Act.  Not only might competing intellectual property potentially 
divert sales, but it also might diminish the intrinsic appeal of Hollywood’s 
products to the extent that it steers cultural preferences in another direction.  As 
one scholar put it, “[m]ediated cultural competition is very much about gaining 
preference for your media product as social glue, which produces a hue of 
solidarity around it.”310 This endeavor to restrict the supply of competing 
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intellectual property clearly goes hand in hand with advocacy for a protectionist 
intellectual property regime and a liberalist trade regime. 
That Hollywood stands to profit through restrictive intellectual property 
rules, liberal international trade rules, and the constriction of supply of 
competing intellectual property is straightforward enough.  Again, the aim in 
broader terms is to maximize the value of their products and the scope of the 
market in which they can move unfettered.  But what about the substance of 
those products?  What type of subject matter and production maximizes return 
for shareholders? 
Cultural theorists like Appiah and Bhabha certainly make an important point 
when they emphasize the inevitable hybridity of all national cultures – the 
permeability of their boundaries, and the inevitability, even desirability, of 
cultural “contamination.”  Hollywood production, however, defies 
categorization in such terms, because Hollywood’s aim is precisely to avoid 
cultural specificity.  It neither contaminates nor is contaminated – if by that we 
mean fruitful contacts among diverse cultures – because it is all of us and none of 
us at the same time.  Within a protectionist intellectual property regime and a 
liberalist trade regime, Hollywood seeks to maximize the appeal of its products 
through a universality intended not to correspond with any national or cultural 
reality.  As A.O. Scott, a film critic for The New York Times, has observed, 
“Hollywood studios, as they try to protect their dominant position in the global 
entertainment market, are ever more heavily invested in fantasy, in conjuring 
counterfeit worlds rather than engaging the one that exists.”311 As his colleague 
Lynn Hirschberg would similarly observe, “corporate finances dictate that they 
cast the widest net possible,” meaning a cultural universality that – ironically, in 
light of the complaints of other nations that they are overrun by “American” 
popular culture – in fact does not reflect America at all.  “Now most big studio 
films aren’t interested in America,” Hirschberg writes, “preferring to depict an 
invented, imagined world, or one filled with easily recognizable plot devices.”312 
As a studio executive preferring to remain unnamed told Hirschberg, American 
films “no longer reflect our culture,” having become “gross, distorted 
exaggerations.”313 Ironically, the “arrival of globalization is not complicating the 
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American stories being told; it is simplifying them…. [N]ow, instead of being 
known for our sense of conversation or style, we are known for our blood and 
gore.”314 Oliver Goodenough expresses a similar insight when he observes 
Hollywood’s “devotion to pushing the hot-buttons of human gratification” – 
“high-violence, high-sex, high-materialist product,” or what he calls “the salt, fat 
and sugar of the human psyche.”  As Goodenough adds, “[p]ut these in the 
theatre, on the tube, or over the radio, and people around the world will 
consume them like salty french fries.”315 
C. Edwin Baker sets out a compelling economic explanation for Hollywood’s 
relentless push toward universality.  Building on the typology of Eli Noam, who 
suggests (for analytical purposes) that media content can be categorized as “D”
for domestic, “U” for universal, and “F” for foreign, Baker (following Noam) 
assumes that a given national population will tend to value D highly, U
somewhat, and F not so much.  One country’s F will of course be another’s D, but 
the crucial observation is that both value U somewhat.  In order to maximize 
profit, “a producer should include each element until its cost becomes greater 
than the revenue its inclusion allows the producer to extract from potential 
audiences,” which predicts that “media products made for domestic audiences 
will contain mostly D, some U, and little if any F.” Under a regime of free trade, 
a producer might be inclined to exploit export opportunities by increasing F, but 
this would only pay in those markets where F happens to be D, and the greater 
amount of F would come at the cost of diminishing the product’s value in the 
home market.  As a consequence, “for a producer seeking to export its creations, 
generally the dominant strategy is to increase U and sacrifice some D.”316 
The greater universality that Baker’s and Noam’s analysis predicts accords 
well with the reality that critics like Scott and Hirschberg have observed in 
American film.  Hirschberg, for example, has observed – again, ironically – that 
the drive for “universal appeal” has led to shooting films abroad in part so that 
“films are set in a movie world with no distinct sense of place,” as well as to a 
generation of “international stars” (mainly men, she observes) “from other 
English-language-speaking countries, like Ireland (Colin Farrell), England (Jude 
Law, Clive Owen), Scotland (Ewan McGregor) or Australia (Russell Crowe).”317 
But of course these dynamics are in no sense specific to U.S. media 
production.  Over recent years, for example, India’s raucous “Bollywood” film 
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industry has enjoyed greater global popularity, particularly – though not 
exclusively – with the Indian diaspora. And of course those profiting from this 
business would love to see it expand further, which raises the question, how best 
to do that?  The first thing to note is that Bollywood’s success outside India to 
date has resulted at least in part from a concerted effort to achieve “the 
validation of the west.”  As Rahul Jacob, writing for The Financial Times, put it, 
“the formula … that Bollywood films now follow is intended to appeal to people 
like me, India’s diaspora in places like the US and the UK.”318 Accordingly, 
Bollywood star Shah Rukh Khan has suggested that “[w]hat Indian cinema needs 
is to wear the garb of western cinema.  We have to make shorter films, introduce 
more special effects and raise the production standards to make our movies more 
appealing to an international audience.”319 Observe that the perceived formula 
for success is not to condition the West to understand Indian cinema or to expect 
the audience to encounter it on its own terms, but to universalize it – to conform 
the art to the requirements of a global audience.  Indeed, filmmakers from other 
countries who have made inroads in the West have quite consciously made 
similar universalizing moves.  Chinese director Chang Yimou, whose 2004 film 
“Hero” (starring Zhang Ziyi) did quite well in the United States, “said he kept 
western audiences in mind as he was shooting.  ‘I tried to get across themes that 
would be understood by a western audience.’”320 Again, the secret to export 
success, in China just as in the United States, is to alter the film, not to expect 
much of the audience.  The economic forces that Baker and Noam identify – 
detectable in other parts of the world striving for a global audience as well – 
suggest that what is truly “American” about Hollywood is not the content it 
purveys so much as its size and capacity to exploit a global market.  As Baker 
puts it, “[m]aybe the often criticized shallowness of American cultural products 
is less intrinsic to American creativity or tastes … than to the commercial realities 
of producing these products for export.”321 
One aspect of Hollywood’s dominance that is actually quite specific to 
America, however, is the sheer size of the home market, which helps explain the 
push for bigger, more expensive films, as well as their global dominance.  The 
growth of DVD sales revenues over recent years – sometimes far exceeding what 
a film makes at the box office – has placed enormous power in the hands of a 
small number of retail chains that together account for a huge percentage of sales 
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in the United States.  Jon Gertner reports that “a handful of big chains have 
assumed a near-cartel on retail DVD sales,” with Best Buy, Target, Costco, Sam’s 
Club, Circuit City, and Blockbuster accounting together for about 42 percent of 
DVD sales in the United States.  But each of these pales beside Wal-Mart, which 
evidently wields such extraordinary buying power that even Hollywood 
executives are terrified of them.  Gertner learned an apparent “axiom of the DVD 
business … that no one discusses Wal-Mart’s influence or its negotiating tactics,” 
though according to one analyst Wal-Mart “alone controls about 22 percent of 
the overall DVD market in the United States and up to 40 percent on any one hit 
title.”  As a consequence of these market dynamics, studio heads listen closely to 
what the retailers have to say, and the upshot is that “limited shelf space … has 
made it increasingly unappealing for studios to acquire smaller projects for 
distribution,” such as independent and foreign films.322 This drive for expensive 
productions and ability to recoup costs through domestic sales, however, clearly 
works to Hollywood’s advantage in the international market, where it has the 
consequence of rendering it increasingly difficult for others to compete.323 
Interestingly, however, even though financial realities push the big 
Hollywood cinemas to think grand and global, it’s these same studios that can 
afford so-called “specialty divisions” that do aim to produce authentically 
American films, notwithstanding the diminished global appeal.  Hirschberg 
points to the example of “Sideways,” starring “four relative unknowns,” which, 
after having been rejected by Universal, was produced by Searchlight – a 
division of Fox that “largely concentrates on reaching a small North American 
audience.”  Films like this (with “no international stars and no action”), and the 
divisions that make them, are clearly not where the money is.  “A mediocre film 
released in thousands of theaters will usually be more successful than a small 
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movie, without stars, that requires clever marketing.”324 That they are made at 
all should perhaps be considered, from the “culture” maven’s perspective, a 
point in Hollywood’s favor and an indication of the devotion to the craft that 
some within these mega-companies bring to their work.  But consider another 
question:  If worldwide sales of Hollywood “event” films are what it takes, in a 
globally liberalized marketplace, to free up small divisions of enormous film 
companies to produce authentically American films on occasion, then what pays 
for authentic local cultural production in the rest of the world?   
At this point, the examination of Hollywood’s business model and its 
consequences brings us back to UNESCO’s Culture Convention – what it 
represents, and what it might accomplish.  Awkward as the drafting may be, the 
Culture Convention is perhaps best read as an assertion of the legitimacy of the 
very types of governmental structures that, in the absence of any capable market 
actor or mechanism, could fill that void.  It is, in essence, an assertion of the 
capacity to register preferences about cultural production other than through a 
globalized marketplace that disfavors the small and local.  It is easy to criticize 
this from the American perspective, though of course as described above, the 
United States simply does not face this dilemma, and in fact profits enormously 
from maintenance of the status quo. While often tarred as “paternalistic,” as 
Baker points out, “this complaint, not intervention, is what is really paternalistic.  
Paternalism lies not in subsidized government structural intervention but in 
refusing to treat the decision about subsidies and intervention as a matter of 
democratic choice.”325 
Baker has compellingly argued that such legal measures should be permitted 
to the extent that liberalized trade exacerbates market failures,326 emphasizing 
(among other things) that the size of its home market gives the United States an 
enormous advantage on the international playing field.  Countries importing 
U.S. cultural products, for example, cannot look to “anti-dumping” rules (which 
generally penalize countries exporting goods below cost) because once media 
products have been created, there is little added cost to producing additional 
copies for export.  The size of Hollywood’s home market permits it to recoup 
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production costs through domestic sales, as well as to create more expensive 
products beyond the reach of producers elsewhere (who lack the home market to 
support their creation), and then to sell those products abroad at lower prices – 
which still brings in a nice return due to the low cost of subsequent copies.327 
The MPAA, of course, simply sidesteps these issues, emphasizing that “in the 
e-commerce world” channel scarcity is no longer a problem, and arguing on this 
basis that protectionist measures like quotas are not justified.328 But the 
hypocrisy of the predominant U.S. position on trade in cultural products – not to 
mention the U.S. no-vote on UNESCO’s Culture Convention – stands out 
perhaps most starkly on the rare occasion that the United States itself actually 
feels culturally threatened by the trade regime (or can benefit rhetorically by 
posturing as if it did).  For example, when a WTO dispute resolution panel ruled 
for Antigua and Barbuda in 2004, finding that “the United States policy 
prohibiting online gambling violates international trade law,” incensed 
congressional leaders did not hesitate to play the culture card.  According to The 
New York Times, “several members of Congress said they would rather have an 
international trade war or withdraw from future rounds of the World Trade 
Organization than have American social policy dictated from abroad.”  As Bob 
Goodlatte, a Republican Representative from Virginia, intoned, “[i]t cannot be 
allowed to stand that another nation can impose its values on the U.S. and make 
it a trade issue.”  Sir Ronald Sanders, the foreign affairs representative of 
Antigua and Barbuda, for his part observed that the United States “says it wants 
open competition,” but “it only wants free trade when it suits the U.S.”329 
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If the regulation of on-line gambling is infused with social and cultural 
significance for the United States to the point that intrusions by the trade regime 
leave members of Congress ready to leave the WTO altogether, then is it really so 
surprising that concerns about national cinema – far more culturally significant 
and economically consequential, by any sensible measure – could lead other 
countries to decline to liberalize their media markets? 
 C. Hard Power, Soft Power, and Enabling Rhetoric 
While Hollywood’s movers and shakers are enormously powerful 
themselves, it must be recognized that their business strategy depends critically 
on the actions of individuals and institutions that are – at least formally – not 
under their control.  Domestic laws come from Congress.330 And foreign 
commitments come from the Executive, as refracted through the Senate, due to 
the latter’s power to approve treaties.331 These constitutional principles 
themselves give rise to additional questions:  Why might the U.S. government 
work so hard to advance Hollywood’s (or rather its shareholders’) interests?  
Setting aside the unsavory thought that our government’s attention can simply 
be bought, and recognizing that elected officials will of course be happy to hear 
Hollywood report that media industries bring in substantial export revenues and 
employ many people,332 the question nevertheless remains:  How might the U.S. 
government’s own goals be advanced through the global dominance of 
Hollywood? 
There is an element of raw power politics in the U.S. pursuit of dominance in 
cultural products trade.  Political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr. 
have drawn a useful distinction between “hard” power – that is, “the ability to 
get others to do what they otherwise would not do through threats or rewards” – 
and “soft” power – that is, “the ability to get desired outcomes because others 
want what you want.”  Getting what one wants “through attraction rather than 
coercion” is the stuff of “soft” power, and this “can rest on the appeal of one’s 
ideas or culture.”  Keohane and Nye observe that the achievement of soft power 
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can result in a country “not need[ing] to expend as many costly traditional 
economic or military resources.”333
In their exploration of expressions of such power, Keohane and Nye observe 
that “soft power is strongly affected by the cultural content of movies and 
television programs,” and that because economies of scale aid such production in 
the United States, the “dominant American market share in films and television 
programs in world markets is therefore likely to continue.”334 The strategic value 
of ensuring that global media remain primarily in the business of piping content 
basically amenable to American values and viewpoints is obvious.  Monroe 
Price’s notion of a “market for loyalties” essentially emphasizes this strategic 
value.  Price identifies a global “competition for influence,” and contends that 
“the argument for free trade is a central element of masking or shaping a 
particular entrant into this market for loyalties on a global basis.”335 In this light, 
the U.S. approach to trade negotiations affecting cultural products might be 
viewed as the employment of hard power (diplomatic pressure coupled with the 
carrot of U.S. market access) in order to facilitate the achievement of soft power 
(cultural products broadly amenable to American values).   
The endeavor to make the world safe for American ideas is itself, however, 
facilitated and enabled by rhetoric that aims to give trade liberalism a patina of 
scientific inevitability, notwithstanding its relatively recent vintage and political 
contingency.  Political scientist John Ruggie, in a well-known article published in 
International Organization in 1982, described the post-World War II order as the 
“embedded liberalism compromise.”  Rejecting both the extreme “economic 
nationalism” of the 1930s and the extreme “liberalism” of the prewar gold 
standard and free trade, embedded liberalism – built upon the Bretton Woods 
institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and the 
GATT regime – represented a middle road that was at once “multilateral in 
character” and “predicated upon domestic interventionism.”336 With respect to 
the trading system, “principles of multilateralism and tariff reductions were 
affirmed, but so were safeguards, exemptions, exceptions, and restrictions – all 
designed to protect the balance of payments and a variety of domestic social 
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policies.”337 Liberalism was, quite literally, to be “embedded” within the larger 
goal of domestic stability.  The history is important because we might observe of 
the debate over cultural products what Ruggie observes more broadly of the 
entire postwar global economic order:  “[I]f we compare changes in the monetary 
and trade regimes against some ideal of orthodox liberalism, then we are bound 
to be disappointed if not shocked by recent trends.  But,” he continues, “we are 
also bound to be misled.  For orthodox liberalism has not governed international 
economic relations at any time during the postwar period.”338 
The United States has expended enormous effort to make things appear 
otherwise.  Recall, for example, as argued above, that the Culture Convention is 
very likely aimed at legitimating the refusal to liberalize audiovisual services 
under the GATS negotiations, notwithstanding the general commitment to 
continue negotiating toward further liberalization.  It is worth pausing to 
consider, however, the origin of the perhaps counterintuitive notion that 
“services” can be “traded” in the first place.  William Drake and Kalypso 
Nicolaidis have exhaustively chronicled the origin of the normative shift toward 
conceptualizing services as tradeable, and the history will strike many as 
surprisingly recent.  Unlike goods, with respect to which the modern argument 
for gains through trade dates back at least to the early 19th century,339 as late as 
1972 virtually no one would have thought of a service as something that could be 
“traded.”  That year, however, “a group of experts” meeting “under the auspices 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) … 
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coined the phrase ‘trade in services.’”  This was the beginning of what Drake and 
Nicolaidis describe as “a revolution in social ontology” that “redefined how 
governments thought about the nature of services, their movement across 
borders, their roles in society, and the objectives and principles according to 
which they should be governed.”340 The new terminology was “embraced 
quickly in the United States,” with a large enough market to have “nurtured 
some of the world’s largest services firms” eager to dismantle barriers to market 
entry abroad.  And the rhetorical benefits of this shift were enormous: 
For American-based [trans-national corporations], the “trade” 
category had a dual appeal.  Internally, it rolled together a new 
political coalition of companies from diverse industries by 
underscoring their common problems and justifying their 
individual demands.  Externally, it gave them each a potent 
discursive weapon with which to advance these demands by 
redefining industry-specific policies as “protectionism,” a charge 
that was less easily ignored by foreign governments than were ad 
hoc appeals for regulatory flexibility.341 
Even by the 1980s those pushing the idea that services should be considered 
tradeable consisted principally of American government officials and business 
people, as opposed to “independent observers” or scholars.  The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, the U.S. Council for International Business, the Conference Board, 
and other business organizations were instrumental in advocating the idea “on 
the conference circuit, in public and private sector meetings, and in a handful of 
publications,” and as a consequence “classical liberal thinking in the American 
mode shaped the agendas of those who were aware of the issues.”342 Meanwhile, 
the United States government pursued the negotiating strategy of pushing to get 
services included in bilateral trade deals “to gain quick entry for American-based 
[companies] in key markets, set a standard for services initiatives, and pressure 
other GATT members into negotiations.”343 As discussed above, the Europeans 
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(spearheaded by the French) ultimately were able to resist audiovisual services 
liberalization under the GATS by declining to make commitments in that sector, 
but the very fact that by the 1990s services were broadly spoken of as tradeable 
constituted a huge rhetorical victory for the U.S. government and industry.  As 
Drake and Nicolaidis observe, “the predominantly Anglo-American analysts 
who first posed the issues established the terms of discourse to which other 
members later had to respond.”  And by linking services liberalization to the 
concept of trade, they were able as a practical matter to reverse the burden of 
persuasion; in “defining services transactions as ‘trade’” they “established 
normative presumptions that ‘free’ trade was the yardstick for good policy 
against which regulations, redefined as nontariff barriers …, should be measured 
and justified only exceptionally.”344 
Those who have ultimately come to recognize an interest in opposing services 
liberalization in cultural sectors, though initially caught on their heals, have in 
the Culture Convention endeavored to reset the default presumptions about the 
relative wisdom of liberalism versus regulation in this area.  As Ruggie would 
observe close to the time of the WTO’s creation, the trade regime created in the 
wake of World War II “was intended to achieve and maintain a sustainable 
balance between the internal and external policy objectives of governments …. It 
was not designed to restructure domestic institutional arrangements.  Yet, 
domestic restructing is what the trade policy agenda increasingly has come to be 
about.”345 The Culture Convention, which, it should be recalled, passed 148-2 
(warts and all), in broader terms builds on this recognition and rejects the 
normative premise that liberalization of media products is inevitable or even 
desirable.  It is an attempt to place back on the United States the burden to 
demonstrate why liberalization in this area is appropriate and/or desirable, and 
by all indication, the United States is failing in that effort. 
In the area of cultural products, however, the United States has deployed not 
only trade rhetoric, but also human rights-based arguments aimed at painting 
cultural protectionist measures as a violation of speech and related rights – 
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notably the right to receive information of one’s choosing.  The U.S. Ambassador 
to UNESCO Louise Oliver has, as described above, attacked the Culture 
Convention not only as potentially destabilizing to the global trade system, but 
as potentially opening the door to speech-related human rights abuses.  
Emphasizing the United States’ own diversity and openness to new ideas, Oliver 
and others suggest that the Culture Convention will do precisely the opposite, 
leading to stasis and homogeneity within national cultures through government 
control of access to ideas.346 Likewise Appiah implicitly makes a human rights-
based attack on the Culture Convention when he suggests that its “principle of 
equal dignity of and respect for all cultures” is contradictory in that “all cultures” 
would also include “those of the K.K.K. and the Taliban.”347 
Such “contradictions” are more apparent – and for those with commercial or 
diplomatic incentives to oppose the Culture Convention, convenient – than real.  
As an interpretive matter, the notion that the Culture Convention somehow 
endorses the racist and ethnocentric lunacy of the K.K.K. and the Taliban is 
plainly incorrect.  The first listed objective of the Culture Convention is “to 
protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions,” and others include 
encouraging “dialogue among cultures” and fostering “interculturality in order 
to develop cultural interaction in the spirit of building bridges among 
peoples.”348 The principle selectively quoted by Appiah, then, reads in full:  “The 
protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions presuppose the 
recognition of equal dignity of and respect for all cultures, including the cultures 
of persons belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples.”349 In other words, 
to accord with the objective, one’s conduct would have to reflect recognition of 
the equal dignity of all.  It is precisely the likes of the Taliban and the K.K.K. the 
conduct of which would accord neither with such objective nor with such 
principle.  Taliban-like and K.K.K.-like views and conduct are rather clearly 
condemned by this principle of the Culture Convention (read in full), not 
respected or permitted by it.350 And just like U.S. officials speaking on the 
Culture Convention, Appiah omits to mention another “principle” – the first 
listed in the instrument, actually – which states that “[n]o one may invoke the 
provisions of this Convention in order to infringe human rights and fundamental 
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freedoms as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or 
guaranteed by international law, or to limit the scope thereof.”  Both “freedom of 
expression” and “the ability of individuals to choose cultural expressions” are 
provided as explicit examples, and the principle is stated without exception or 
qualification.351 In an explanatory document, UNESCO cites this principle as 
ensuring that “the risk of cultural relativism, which in the name of diversity 
would recognize cultural practices that infringe the fundamental principles of 
human rights, has been eliminated.”352 
Indeed, blurry as the operative definitions may be, it is difficult to imagine 
such a document having the practical effect on governments’ human rights 
compliance that I have argued it will have on their approach to trade 
negotiations.  A commentary published in The Washington Times by a past fellow 
of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a policy think tank describing itself as 
“dedicated to advancing the principles of free enterprise and limited 
government,”353 includes the following paragraph: 
The day of the UNESCO decision, word came that the theocracy 
running Iran ordered tight restrictions on what movies can be 
shown in that country’s theaters.  The ‘distribution and screening of 
foreign films which promote secular, feminist, liberal or nihilist 
ideas’ is officially forbidden.  Like the UNESCO treaty, Iran’s ban is 
a none-too-subtle shot at Hollywood.354 
While the author does not go so far as to state that the one caused the other, the 
implication is clear.  But are we actually to believe that Iran’s government feels 
newly empowered to censor the information available to its citizens from abroad 
in a way or to a degree that it did not previously and would not have otherwise, 
but for this document?  The author does not go this far because to do so would 
be ludicrous; the reality is that Iran was Iran both on the Wednesday before the 
Culture Convention’s adoption and on the Friday afterward.  Indeed, should the 
likes of Iran try to justify censorship by reference to the Culture Convention, they 
would immediately run into human rights commitments (via Article 2:1 of the 
 
351 Culture Convention, supra note 27, art. 2:1. 
352 Ten Keys to the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 
at 7, available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/file_download.php/f5941da8a7fdc57bba15886d6fa41199tenke
ys_en.pdf (accessed Jan. 25, 2007). 
353 See About CEI, available at http://www.cei.org/pages/about.htm (accessed Oct. 5, 2006). 
354 Neil Hrab, Internet in U.N. hands?, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, at A17, available at Lexis. 
80 
Culture Convention) that they have already made in other documents.355 
Whatever ambiguity Article 20 of the Culture Convention may engender with 
respect to its status vis-à-vis trade agreements, there is no such ambiguity with 
respect to human rights.  The latter trumps the Culture Convention by its own 
terms. 
And what does the body of human rights law itself have to say about speech 
and cultural diversity?  In essence it endeavors to balance them – a reality hardly 
militating toward comprehensively defaulting to the market on cultural matters.  
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (not a treaty, but a proclamation of 
the UN General Assembly) says both that all have the right “to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers,” 
and that all have the right “freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community.”356 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights says 
that “peoples have the right of self-determination” including the right to “freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development,” but also that all have 
the right “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.”357 The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights likewise says that “peoples have the right 
of self-determination” including the right to “freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development,” but also requires parties to take steps “necessary for 
the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture.”358 
These important human rights documents recognize that the expression of 
preferences about culture and values take place both at the level of consumers 
acting individually in markets and at the level of citizens acting collectively as a 
polity, and as others have suggested, government intervention may be necessary 
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to enhance overall speech opportunities due to media market failures.  Baker, for 
example, has argued that a significant problem with measuring what audiences 
want solely by reference to what they will pay in a market for cultural products 
is that this simply ignores larger social “externalities” – including the formation 
of values and beliefs – which are particularly potent in the realm of media.  This 
is in large part what media regulation endeavors to address, and such intangible 
externalities are virtually impossible to measure in dollar terms.359 Baker relays 
the observation of George Gerbner “that the age of commercial television is the 
first time in human history that children learn about themselves and the world 
primarily by listening to corporations with something to sell rather than to 
people with something to tell.”360 In light of the potential for over-
commodification of communications through the market, Baker asks “why not 
merely allow people to choose” to what degree communications should be 
commodified?361 The MPAA, of course, has traditionally dismissed non-market 
modes of expression of preferences.  Valenti, for example, “argued that 
Europeans prefer American programming, claiming that Europeans ‘like, 
admire, and patronize what we offer them,’” and characterized EU audiovisual 
policy as pure commercial protectionism, dismissing the possibility that such 
policies themselves constitute an expression of a cultural preference.362 Indeed, 
people might rationally choose to curtail the influence of media market actors 
precisely because they recognize the media’s capacity to distort their own 
preferences.363 
While it is undoubtedly the case that one’s view on the role of media in 
society is intimately bound up with one’s view of democracy and the proper 
bounds of governmental power,364 it is important not to lose sight of the fact that 
the legal regime most directly addressing such issues is the corpus of human 
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rights law, described above, to which virtually all (at least pretend to) adhere,365 
and the primacy of which is clearly established in the Culture Convention.  No 
credible participant in the discussion is actually claiming that outright censorship 
– a governmental effort to keep foreign ideas out – is desirable or legally 
permissible.366 The Culture Convention affirms the balance to be struck – an 
approach resonating not only with the instrument’s principal sponsors, Canada 
and France, ever fearful of U.S. media domination,367 but also with developing 
countries seeking to avoid the twin dangers of excessive government control and 
excessive market control.  As Robert Martin has observed of mass media 
development in Africa, for example, there is “a subtle and difficult balance to be 
struck.”  While state domination of the media remains a problem in many 
developing countries, there is likewise “a real danger that newspapers and other 
publications may be free from state control only to be swallowed up by 
international interests” – especially in broadcasting, for which production costs 
“are such that many African networks have already allowed themselves to 
become dumping grounds for old, and often inferior, western programmes.”368 
Ironically, it was precisely this form of balance that UNESCO’s “MacBride 
report” – over which the United States left UNESCO – reflected,369 and which the 
United States continues to impede today. 
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VII. From Cannes to Hollywood 
In a series of essays published in The New England Journal of Medicine between 
1971 and 1973, physician Lewis Thomas – like UNESCO – analogized cultural 
diversity to biodiversity, celebrating the nascent technological globalization that 
was beginning to bring distant peoples into contact with one another, with a 
previously dreamt of immediacy.  In considering what this capacity for global 
communication meant for us as individuals, societies, and humanity, Thomas 
mused that the “human brain is the most public organ on the face of the earth, 
open to everything, sending out messages to everything” – and that as a 
consequence of this permeability, both acting upon the world and acted upon by 
it, the “whole dear notion of one’s Self – marvelous old free-willed, free-
enterprising, autonomous, independent, isolated island of a Self – is a myth.”  
And as for individuals, Thomas thought, so for cultures: 
Maybe the thoughts we generate today and flick around from mind 
to mind, like the jokes that turn up simultaneously at dinner parties 
in Hong Kong and Boston, or the sudden changes in the way we 
wear our hair, or all the popular love songs, are the primitive 
precursors of more complicated, polymerized structures that will 
come later, analogous to the prokaryotic cells that drifted through 
shallow pools in the early days of biological evolution.370 
Perhaps – only time will tell.  As Thomas went on to observe, “we’ve been at it 
for only the briefest time in evolutionary terms, a few thousand years out of 
billions, and during most of this time the scattered aggregates of human thought 
have been located patchily around the earth.”  The then-current “structures of art 
and science” reflected the growing exchanges across cultures, and this process 
could be expected to proceed over time, “by simply passing the bits around from 
mind to mind, until something like natural selection makes the final selection, all 
on grounds of fitness.”371 
In the meantime, however, observe the implicit requirements of such fruitful 
exchanges, analogized by Thomas to the benefits of biodiversity:  first, diversity, 
and second, contact.  Both are essential, or the benefits of cultural contact are lost 
utterly.  Thomas’ perspective as of the early 1970s was essentially identical to 
that of UNESCO’s founders in the 1940s.  Just like UNESCO’s constitution, 
Thomas assumed that cultural diversity could be taken for granted, but that 
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contact could not;372 global communications essentially remained nascent. But as 
of late 2005, when the Culture Convention was adopted, could the same be said?  
At least in the view of the 148 national delegations that voted to approve the 
Culture Convention, the reality had radically altered.  In an ever-shrinking global 
media landscape, in which American content grows ever more dominant, it 
would appear that the situation has reversed:  Contact can be taken for granted 
(if only one-way), but cultural diversity cannot.  The end goal – the fruitful 
encounter of diverse cultures – remains the same, but the steps needed to get 
there have changed considerably.  France, Canada, and many other countries 
around the world fear that in the absence of some capacity to facilitate local 
cultural production, the market will select a single global winner by very 
different criteria of “fitness” than we might favor upon reflection.  Domestic 
politics, embedding cultural production in a larger set of values and preferences 
than the market can accommodate – a sort of “embedded cultural liberalism,” as 
it were – will be the policy context in which the intersection of culture and trade 
will be determined.  Or at least so says the Culture Convention. 
The United States’ denial of this reality, this assertion of sovereign 
prerogative, coupled with the smokescreen of patently self-serving rhetoric, rings 
increasingly hollow.  People know special interest capture when they see it – 
especially before the backdrop of such resounding global consensus.  The United 
States may, to be sure, get what it wants moving forward; there is already 
evidence to suggest that the Culture Convention has not altered America’s 
negotiating position in any fundamental way, at least in bilateral negotiations.373 
But it will not be easy, and if it comes, it will not come for free.  As the WTO 
Appellate Body itself observed,  
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The WTO Agreement is a treaty – the international equivalent of a 
contract.  It is self-evident that in an exercise of their sovereignty, 
and in pursuit of their own respective national interests, the 
Members of the WTO have made a bargain.  In exchange for the 
benefits they expect to derive as Members of the WTO, they have 
agreed to exercise their sovereignty according to the commitments 
they have made in the WTO Agreement.374 
In evaluating the potential for trade in cultural products in these terms, the cost 
of liberalization is felt to be very, very high for countries like France, Canada, 
and many others.  And because the United States refuses to recognize this cost – 
in fact, portraying Hollywood’s bigger, shinier products as beneficial – it 
acknowledges neither the need to put correspondingly attractive benefits on the 
table, nor that, ultimately, such market access may well not be for sale at any 
price. 
Until the United States recognizes the costs of liberalization in cultural 
products for the rest of the world, the distance between Cannes and Hollywood 
will remain very great indeed.   
 
374 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 60, pt. F. 
